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Introduction
Decades ago, the pattern of securities holding was fairly simple. Own-
ers had possession of certificates. They transferred ownership by delivery
of the certificates, plus, in the case of registered securities, surrender of the
certificate to the issuer for registration of transfer. They pledged the secur-
ities by delivery of the certificates from the borrower to the lender. These
practices also made issues concerning conflict of laws fairly simple. For
debt securities in bearer form, possession was the key to ownership, and
delivery of possession was the key to transfer or pledge. Thus, for pur-
poses of conflict of laws, bearer certificates could be treated in the same
fashion as any other tangible moveable object of property. The law gov-
erning a transaction involving a bearer certificate was determined by the
t Professor, Boston College Law School. The author served as a member of the
United States Delegation to the Hague Convention and as a member of the Drafting
Group for the Convention. The views expressed in this article, however, are solely the
author's personal views. Thanks to Ingrid Hillinger and Harry Sigman for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
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location of the certificate, an approach commonly referred to as lex situs or
lex rei sitae. l The law was only slightly more complicated for registered
securities, for which the governing law was generally determined by the
location of the issuer or transfer agent that maintained the official record
of securities holding. 2
In recent decades, conditions have changed dramatically. Although
some individual investors still take possession of certificates, or are
directly recorded on the books to the issuers of the securities as the hold-
ers, that is now the exception rather than the rule. Investors typically hold
through accounts with brokers or banks. Brokers and banks, in turn, hold
through accounts with other intermediaries, and, ultimately, through
accounts maintained by central securities depositories. 3 The change in
patterns of securities holding poses challenges for the domestic substan-
tive law. Different countries have responded to that challenge in different
ways. 4 The diversity of patterns of substantive law poses a particular prob-
lem for transnational securities holding. Traditional principles of conflict
of laws indicated that the location of either the certificates or the issuer
determined the governing law. That traditional approach is unworkable
for modern indirect securities holding. Accordingly, the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law has undertaken a project to formulate a
new set of conflict of laws rules for securities held through intermediaries.
The basic principle of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary5 is that
where securities are held through an intermediary, the law that governs a
transaction effected by entries made on the books of a securities intermedi-
ary is determined solely by the relationship between the investor and the
intermediary. The Hague Convention rejects any approach under which
the law governing a transaction in indirectly-held securities is determined
by reference to connecting factors affecting the underlying securities.6 In
1. 2 DICEY & MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 917-18 (Lawrence Collins ed., 13th
ed.2000).
2. ld. at 930-31.
3. James S. Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised vee Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1431,1441-49 (1996).
4. See generally CROSS BORDER COLLATERAL: LEGAL RISK AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(Richard Potok ed., 2002) (analyzing the conflict of laws regimes with regard to indi-
rectly-held securities in twenty-five different jurisdictions).
5. The text of the Convention [hereinafter Hague Convention] can be found at the
Hague Conference website at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act= conven-
tions.text& cid=72. The Hague Convention website also includes the prinCipal prelimi-
nary documents that illustrate the drafting history of the Convention. These are cited
herein as Pre!. Doc. No. x.
The success of the Hague Convention project is due in no small measure to the
extraordinary preliminary work on the project performed by Dr. Christophe Bernasconi
of the Hague Commission Permanent Bureau and Richard Potok who served as Legal
Expert to the Commission. The best account of the challenges that faced the project is
their preliminary REPORT ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO DISPOSlTIONS OF SECURITIES HELD
THROUGH INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEMS (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter Pre!. Doc. No.1).
6. Roy GOODE ET AL., EXPLANATORY REpORT ON THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE LAw
APPLICABLE TO CERTAIN RIGHTS IN RESPECT OF SECURITIES HELD WITH AN INTERMEDIARY
18-19 (HCCH 2005) [hereinafter EXPLANATORY REPORT].
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the initial stages of the discussion leading to the Convention, the thought
was that the basic rule might be described as the "Place of the Relevant
Intermediary Approach" or "PRIMA" rather than the "look through"
approach.7
Ultimately, however, the drafters of the Convention were forced to
adopt a variant of the basic PRIMA approach. After long discussion in
many fora, the drafters concluded that one could not really give coherent
meaning to the notion of a "place" of the relevant intermediary. There was
never any real dispute over the basic pOint that the law governing transac-
tions in securities held with an intermediary should be determined solely
by reference to factors involving the relationship between the investor and
intermediary. However, the Convention ultimately adopted the principle
that the law governing a transaction effected on the books of an intermedi-
ary is, in general, determined by the law selected by the intermediary and
customer.8 This decision has proved somewhat controversial. A good deal
of discussion of the wisdom of the approach taken in the Hague Conven-
tion has, regrettably, misidentified the issue as a choice between some ver-
sion of a lex situs approach and an approach based on party autonomy.9
That is simply a misunderstanding.
To see the point, suppose that Borrower borrows money from Lender,
and, as collateral for the loan, grants Lender a mortgage on certain real
estate owned by Borrower. Traditional conflict of laws principles would
say that while Lender and Borrower can, by agreement, select the law that
governs their own contractual duties, they cannot select the law that deter-
mines whether the mortgage is effective. The latter is a matter that affects
the rights of others, such as other creditors of Borrower, and as such is not
an appropriate subject for determination by agreement between Borrower
and Lender. Rather, the law governing the effectiveness of the mortgage is
determined by the location of the property.
Now suppose that Borrower holds securities through an account with
Intermediary and wishes to pledge that securities position to Lender as
collateral for a loan. It would indeed be unusual to say that Borrower and
Lender can, by private agreement, determine the law governing the effec-
tiveness of the pledge. Such an approach might aptly be called a "party
autonomy" approach to third parties' rights, and might well be criticized on
those grounds. But, that is not what the Hague Convention does. The
Hague Convention does not say that Borrower and Lender can select the
law that will govern the proprietary effects of the transaction. Rather, the
Convention says that the law selected by agreement between Borrower and
7. Id. at 19-20.
8. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 4; EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 6, at
19-20.
9. E.g., Ignacio G6mez-Sancha, Discussion Paper on the Effects of the Hague Con-
vention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an
Intermediary (Feb 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author; abstract avail-
able at http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/?qN~de/135).
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Intermediary-if that selection meets certain criteria-will govern any
transaction between Borrower and Lender.
This article considers some of the basic issues that must be resolved in
any effort to devise appropriate modern rules for conflict of laws for indi-
rectly-held securities. It discusses in detail some of the provisions of the
Hague Convention and some of the drafting history of that convention. It
does not, however, attempt a detailed discussion of all of the elements of
the Convention. IO At present, it remains uncertain whether the proposed
Hague Convention will be widely ratified. Whether or not ratification
occurs, the problems treated in the Convention will remain real. Accord-
ingly, the issues confronted and solutions proposed in the Convention will
be an essential part of the analysis of any lawyer or judge called upon to
consider conflict of laws issues for indirectly-held securities.
The analysis begins in Part I by exploring the pervasive nature of con-
flict of laws problems in this field. Part II notes that the problems are par-
ticularly difficult because the key lawyer role in this area is planner rather
than litigator. Part III outlines some of the problems presented by the ten-
dency to use abstract hypothetical fact patterns in exploring problems in
this field. Part IV explores the difference between conflict of laws
problems and substantive law problems, demonstrating that the approach
adopted by the Hague Convention is genuinely neutral-that is, it works
regardless of the characterization of securities holding through
intermediaries followed by various systems of substantive law. Part V
describes the difficulties confronted in the Hague Convention drafting pro-
cess in giving specific content to the notion that the governing law is deter-
mined by factors relating solely to the relationship between the
intermediary and its customer. In particular, Part V explains why it is inac-
curate to describe the Hague Convention as adopting a party autonomy
approach to conflict of laws problems involving third parties' rights. The
article concludes with an examination of matters that are not the subject of
the Hague Convention. Part VI explains why regulatory issues are unaf-
fected by the Convention, and Part VII examines in some detail the differ-
ence between the issues of property that are the subject of the Convention
and the issues of contract that are unaffected by the Convention.
I. The Problem of Non-Uniformity of Conflict of Laws Rules
Suppose we are representing either Borrower or Lender in a proposed
transaction in which a loan is to be secured by a pledgeI 1 of a security held
by the borrower through an account with a broker or bank (Intermediary).
For simplicity, suppose that however we might define "location," each of
Borrower, Lender, and Intermediary are located in a certain jurisdiction,
10. The best detailed treatment of the Convention is the EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra
note 6.
11. For convenience the term "pledge" is used herein to refer to any form of security
interest in securities, whether held directly or indirectly, rather than in the narrower
sense of a possessory interest in a securities certificate.
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"Atlantis." Suppose further that the substantive law of Atlantis is quite
clear and settled on how one establishes an effective pledge of securities
held through an intermediary. On these assumptions, any litigation con-
cerning the pledge is bound to involve only parties located in Atlantis.
Given these simplifying assumptions, one would think that no difficult
conflict of laws issues would arise. The substantive law of Atlantis should
determine whether the pledge is effective, that is whether the transfer from
Borrower to Lender of the rights that Borrower had is effective against Bor-
rower and Borrower's creditors. Oddly, traditional conflict of laws princi-
ples make it unlikely that these questions would be determined by Atlantis
law, at least other than by fortuity.
Under traditional conflict of laws principles, these questions are mat-
ters of proprietary rights in the collateral, and the securities are the collat-
eral. Thus questions concerning the pledge would be determined by the
substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the securities are located. 12
That location may vary somewhat depending on the nature of the securi-
ties. If the securities are represented by certificates in bearer form, the
location will be the physical location of the certificates. If the securities are
in registered form, the location is probably the location of the issuer or of
the transfer agent that maintains the registry. If these jurisdictions happen
to be Atlantis, then there is no conflict of laws problem. But, if Borrower
holds securities of a non-Atlantis issuer, or securities for which the certifi-
cate may be located outside of Atlantis, then the transaction cannot be
safely implemented on the basis of Atlantis law alone. Rather, the parties
would have to consider how to implement a pledge under the law of the
jurisdiction where the securities are considered to be located.
The problem becomes even more severe if the collateral is to be a col-
lection of securities issued by issuers in different locations. Suppose that
Borrower proposes to pledge to Lender all of the securities carried through
the account, or, what comes to the same thing, the account itself. Suppose
that Borrower carries through the account securities of dozens or hundreds
of different issuers and that the issuers of the securities are located in doz-
ens of different jurisdictions around the globe. The traditional conflict of
laws approach would regard the proposed transaction as a pledge of a vari-
ety of items of property and would analyze the conflict of laws issue secur-
ity by security. Thus, the parties could not implement the transaction with
any degree of confidence unless they felt relatively sure that the method of
pledge would be effective under the law of each of the jurisdictions where
the underlying securities would be regarded as being located.
12. Some jurisdictions have already revised their own conflict of laws rules to take
account of these problems. For example, if litigation occurs in one of the states of the
United States, and an issue arises concerning the law that governs the effectiveness of a
security interest in indirectly-held securities, current U.S. law, adopted as part of the
U.e.e. Article 8 revision project, provides that the governing law is determined by the
agreement between the account holder and intermediary. See U.e.e. §§ 8-110(b), (e), 9-
305(a)(3) (2004).
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Thus far we have made the simplifying assumption that Borrower,
Lender, Intermediary, and any other parties who might have an interest in
the effectiveness of the pledge are located in Atlantis. Now, suppose that
any or all of Borrower, Lender, and Intermediary are engaged in activities
in jurisdictions other than Atlantis. Suppose that a lawyer implementing
the proposed transaction is asked "Which state's law will determine the
effectiveness of the pledge?" The answer, distressing as it may be, is that
that question cannot be answered.
II. Conflict of Laws-Litigator Versus Planner
Consider how the subject of conflict of laws is typically presented. A
standard American treatise on the subject begins as follows:
What is the subject matter of the conflict of laws? A fairly neutral definition
. . . is that the conflict of laws is the study of whether or not and, if so, in
what way, the answer to a legal question will be affected because the ele-
ments of the problem have contacts with more than one jurisdiction....
A classic conflicts problem will help clarify this rather abstract defini-
tion. A husband and wife reside in state X. They go for a short pleasure
drive into state Y. While in state Y, because of the husband's negligence, the
automobile runs off the road and the wife is injured. Under the law of state
X, a wife may sue her husband to recover damages that she has suffered
because of his negligence. State Y, however, does not permit such suits
between wives and husbands. 13
Note what is implicit in that description: the events have occurred, a law-
suit has been brought or is contemplated, and the question is which state's
law the forum court will apply. Law is seen through the eyes of the lawyer
as litigator.
Recall the scenario with which we began. Borrower wishes to borrow
from Lender and offers as collateral securities held through an account
with Intermediary. The lawyer is called upon not to initiate or defend a
lawsuit, but to decide whether the transaction can be done with a fair
degree of safety and, if so, how to implement the transaction. The key law-
yer role is planner. If the lawyer cannot, with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty, determine the legal consequences of the proposed implementation,
the advice is likely to be that the deal should not be done. Consider the
following anecdote recalled by the prominent Canadian business lawyer,
Bradley Crawford:
[AJ few years ago I was unable to complete a transaction for a short-term
secured loan by a Canadian bank to a Canadian life insurance company after
a week of trying to piece together the legal advice necessary to do the deal.
The security for the loan was to be bonds of a foreign issuer that had been
deposited into Cedel (now Clearstream) in Luxembourg. The physical certif-
icates were actually being held in safekeeping in the Cayman Islands, for tax
reasons, and could not be moved. The bonds were owned not by the Cana-
dian life company directly, but by its French subsidiary, which had its chief
executive offices in Paris. Five law firms struggled for a week to figure out
13. RUSSELL]. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (2d ed. 1980).
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how to put together the chain of opinions that would be necessary to assure
the lender that the loan was fully secured by the bonds, and could not do it.
Because we were unable to advise the client as to the nature and extent of the
risks involved, it could not price the transaction appropriately or get internal
approval to proceed.14
To the lawyer as litigator, lawsuits are the world. To the lawyer as planner,
a lawsuit is the underworld. The question is not what happens once we
have crossed the Styx, but how to stay on this side.
Consider the steps in conflict of laws analysis from the standpoint of
lawyers playing various different roles, such as judge, litigator, and plan-
ner. The judge has the easiest task. A lawsuit has been filed in the judge's
court. That fact alone resolves the question of which state's conflict of
laws rules to apply. Of necessity, a forum court always applies its own
conflict of laws rules. To be sure, there may be difficulties in the applica-
tion of those conflict of laws rules, but at least the judge knows which rules
to apply.
The litigator has a slightly more difficult task. For defense counsel,
the problem is basically the same as that of the judge. The lawsuit has
been filed, and the forum court's conflict of laws rules will determine
which state's substantive law will be applied. For plaintiffs lawyer, the
task is a bit more difficult. Plaintiffs lawyer must first consider where to
file suit. For example, in the simple case of the husband and wife who
reside in State X but were involved in an automobile accident in State Y, the
wife's lawyer must decide whether to sue in State X or State Y. As part of
that decision, the lawyer will consider the conflict of laws rules that would
be applied by courts in States X and Y.
Now consider the issue from the standpoint of lawyer as planner.
Suppose that before any accident has occurred, Wife asks whether it is safe
to drive with Husband. Realistically, the answer is that it depends on how
good a driver Husband is. But, passing that point, suppose that Wife says
that she is willing to run the risk of Husband's poor driving, so long as she
will be able to sue him in the event that his negligence causes an accident.
A litigator would ask, "Where did the accident take place?" Wife, of
course, would say "1 don't know, 1 hope there isn't any accident." The liti-
gator might persist and ask, "But if there is an accident, where will it take
place?" Wife, becoming more frustrated, might respond, "We are planning
an automobile trip that will take us all around the globe, through several
hundred countries."
The lawyer will have to set aside the litigator role in favor of the plan-
ner role, and will have to proceed through several steps. First, the planning
lawyer must surmise what sorts of things might go wrong that would lead
to litigation. Second, the planning lawyer must consider where litigation
might be brought. That depends not only on what happens but also on the
rules of various jurisdictions concerning personal jurisdiction. Third, for
14. Bradley Crawford, The Hague "Prima" Convention: Choice of Law to Govern Rec-
ognition of Dispositions of Book-Based Securities in Cross Border Transactions, 38 CAN. Bus.
Lj. 157, 163 (2003).
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each possible forum location, the planning lawyer must consider what con-
flict of laws rules the courts of that jurisdiction would apply. Fourth, the
planning lawyer must consider what result would be reached applying the
substantive law determined by the answers to the previous questions.
Now, return to the scenario of Borrower who wishes to pledge to
Lender securities held through an account with Intermediary. Assume that
Borrower, Lender, and Intermediary are each engaged in activities in multi-
ple jurisdictions. The question that a lawyer planning the transaction
wants to ask is "Which state's law will determine the effectiveness of the
pledge?" But as the simple hypothetical of Husband and Wife illustrates,
there really is no answer to that question.
First, the planning lawyer must consider what sorts of litigation might
arise in which the question of the effectiveness of the pledge might be
raised. Next, the planning lawyer must consider where such litigation
might arise. In the insolvency context, that would depend on the nature of
Borrower's business, the states in which it conducts operations, and the
law of all of those potential states concerning the jurisdiction of the insol-
vency courts of that state. Having made what can only be termed an edu-
cated guess about the possible places where litigation concerning the
effectiveness of the pledge might be brought, the planning lawyer must
then consider the conflict of laws rules that would be applied by the courts
of each of those states. If any of those states follows the approach to con-
flict of laws under which the question of the effectiveness of a pledge is
determined by the location of the property, then the planning lawyer must
determine the likely location of the pledged securities. If the proposed col-
lateral is to be all securities carried through the account, and if Borrower
has a diverse international portfolio, then there may well be dozens or hun-
dreds of jurisdiction to consider.
Note that a significant element in the conflict of laws analysis is pre-
dicting the likely fora. In a case of the sort we have been imagining, where
a single borrower is contemplating a pledge to a single lender, the number
of possible jurisdictions that must be considered can probably be deter-
mined by considering the nature of the borrower's business. But, consider
another scenario in which the conflict of laws issue is even harder to
resolve. Suppose that the planning lawyer is advising Intermediary. Inter-
mediary has customers in a large number of different states. Suppose that
the timing of purchases of securities by Intermediary's customers is not
exactly simultaneous with the payment for those purchases. Intermediary
then faces some degree of risk that it will not receive payment for
purchases that have been credited to the account. As a business matter, the
solution to that problem is simple. The agreement between Intermediary
and its customers will say that if the customer does not make final pay-
ment, then Intermediary can reverse any credit that was made to the
account. As a legal matter, however, it is not so Simple to categorize Inter-
mediary's right.
One possibility is to say that Intermediary has credited the account,
but that Intermediary has a security interest in the positions to secure the
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customer's obligation to pay. Another possibility is to say that Intermedi-
ary has not "really" credited the account, but has just made some provi-
sional entries that will "actually" result in a credit to the account only if
customer makes payment. If Intermediary knows which jurisdiction's law
would determine its rights, and if that jurisdiction has simple rules on
security interests, then Intermediary can safely proceed. If, however, there
is doubt about the effectiveness of such a security interest, then Intermedi-
ary might conclude that it is worthwhile to go through the accounting and
documentation nuisance that may be required to support an argument that
any credits made for unpaid positions were only provisional.
How can the planning lawyer decide whether to advise Intermediary
that it is safe in relying on a security interest structure or to make the effort
that may be required to support a "provisional credit" argument? Suppose
that the law is clear in Intermediary's home jurisdiction that the security
interest structure works. That conclusion does no good unless the plan-
ning lawyer can safely conclude that the law of Intermediary's home juris-
diction would be applied. Suppose that the planning lawyer finds that
courts in Intermediary's home jurisdiction would apply a conflict of laws
rule under which the effectiveness of the security interest is determined by
the law of Intermediary's home jurisdiction. That is nice, but it is not par-
ticularly helpful unless the planning lawyer can predict with fair confi-
dence that litigation on the matter will occur in the courts of
Intermediary's home jurisdiction. If Intermediary has a significant inter-
national customer base, there is no way that the planning lawyer can reach
that conclusion. The most likely forum in which the issue might arise
would be an insolvency proceeding for the customer. The most likely
forum for such a proceeding would be the customer's home jurisdiction,
not the intermediary's jurisdiction. Thus, it is very hard for the planning
lawyer to make an intelligent choice about how to structure its systems and
documentation without knowing what conflict of laws rules would be
applied by courts in every jurisdiction in which its customers are located.
Thus, if we think of conflict of laws questions for securities held
through intermediaries from the perspective of a planning lawyer, we see
that lack of consistency in the rules that would be applied by courts
around the globe is a particularly pernicious problem. To be sure, it would
be nice if the substantive laws of all countries around the globe were suffi-
ciently consistent on these matters that the conflict oflaws issues would be
insignificant. It is, however, most unlikely that that will ever happen.
There are genuine fundamental differences of approach to the basic struc-
ture of the substantive law of securities holding through intermediaries. In
addition, there are major differences in how the law of securities holding
through intermediaries is integrated into the rest of the corpus of the law.
That issue might be treated as part of the commercial law, quite separate
from the law governing other aspects of the internal operations of the inter-
mediary. Or, the issue might be treated as part of the corporate or other
law governing the activities of the entities that are engaged in the business.
A jurisdiction might draw a sharp line between the commercial law of
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secuntIes holding and the regulatory law governing the activities of the
entities that are permitted to engage in the business of maintaining securi-
ties accounts. Or, a jurisdiction might locate the law defining the rights of
Customer and Intermediary in the regulatory law governing the business
of securities intermediaries. It is unlikely that sufficient consensus on all
of these matters can be achieved anytime in the foreseeable future. IS
A striking example of the problem is provided by the recent experience
of the United States and Canada. It would be hard to imagine two coun-
tries with more closely linked economies and legal traditions. The United
States revised its substantive law of indirect securities holding in the early
1990s in revised Article 8 of the U.e.e. Shortly thereafter, a project was
initiated to revise Canadian law in a fashion consistent with the u.s.
revised Article 8. 16 Extremely capable, diligent, and committed people
have worked on the Canadian project for over a decade. But, it has proven
to be a significant task to achieve an approach that is true to the rest of
Canadian domestic law as well as consistent with the laws of the United
States. There are, for example, significant differences between the United
15. Unidroit has recently undertaken a project to draft a Convention on Harmonised
Substantive Rules Regarding Securities Held with an Intermediary. See UNIDROIT,
Intermediated Securities - Study LXXVIII, http://www.unidroit.org/english/ work-
programme/study078/iteml/main.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). While that project
will certainly be useful in educating lawyers around the globe about the problems of the
substantive law of indirect securities holding, and might provide a model for countries
that have not yet undertaken any legislative action in the field, in the opinion of the
present author there is no realistic prospect that any such convention will be widely
adopted. Countries that have established capital markets have had to go through the
difficult process of adapting their domestic law to the challenges of the modern indirect
holding system. It is hard to see why any country that has already undertaken that task
would go through the process again, yet that is what would be required to ratify any
international convention on substantive law. As I have elsewhere noted:
[I]mplementing these fundamental principles within the domestic legal systems
of particular states is perhaps the most challenging aspect of the task of mod-
ernizing the commercial law of the securities holding and transfer system. Here,
as in any other branch of the law, general principles can be implemented in
various ways in different legal systems. There has probably never been a legal
system that did not proscribe murder and theft, yet one would hardly suppose
that the existence of consensus on these fundamental points means that the law
of major crimes is uniform among all nations or that a lawyer experienced in the
law of crimes and criminal procedure in one nation could deal readily with
another nation's laws on these matters. For essentially the same reasons, reach-
ing consensus on the fundamental principles that should guide the moderniza-
tion of the law of securities holding through intermediaries will necessarily be
the beginning not the end of the effort to achieve a workable level of interna-
tional harmonization. Differing local conditions and history are likely to make
it necessary to implement the basic principles in different ways, because these
basic principles cannot stand alone but must instead be integrated into the gen-
eral corpus of each nation's own domestic law.
James S. Rogers, Toward International Harmonization of the Commercial Law of the Mod-
ern Securities Holding and Transfer System in CAPITAL MARKETS FORUM, INTERNATIONAL BAR
AsS'N, MODERNIZING SECURITIES OWNERSHIP, TRANSFER AND PLEDGING LAws 60 (1996).
16. For an overview of the Canadian project, see Eric T. Spink &: Maxime A. Pare,
The Uniform Securities Transfer Act: Globalized Commercial Law for Canada, 19 BANKING
&: FIN. L. REv. 321 (2004). Relevant documents from the Canadian project are available
at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca.
2006 Conflict of Laws for Transactions 295
States and Canada on the division between federal and state or provincial
authority and between matters that are treated as part of commercial law
and corporate law. 17 The experience of the United States and Canada
strongly suggests that when attention is shifted to a broader global hori-
zon, seeking uniformity on conflict of laws is a far more realistic objective
than seeking comprehensive harmonization of substantive law.
Finally, it is important to remember that the principal users of this
body of law are not litigators or judges. Planning, not litigation, is the key
lawyer act that calls for resolution of issues of conflict of laws and substan-
tive law on securities holding through intermediaries. The transactions
commonly involve very large sums of money and therefore warrant careful
planning. The key legal question may not be simply whether the pledge is
effective, but whether a competent lawyer can give an opinion of counsel
asserting that the pledge is effective. Competent lawyers do not give opin-
ions on foreign law, and that is true even if the result that would be reached
under foreign law is probably the same as would be reached under the law
of the opining lawyer's home jurisdiction. Thus, if the rules on conflict of
laws for securities holding through intermediaries are not relatively cer-
tain, it is likely that transactions either will not be implemented, or will be
implemented only at a higher cost.
1lI. Reality Versus Hypotheticals
In considering conflict of laws issues for indirectly-held securities, it is
probably inevitable that one will begin with a set of hypothetical facts.
Consider, for example, the scenario described in the introductory portion
of the Explanatory Report on the Hague Convention: 18 Shares of Illinois,
Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois in the
United States, are held through an account at Depository Trust Company
in New York. Part of the block of Illinois Inc. shares are shown on DTC's
books as being held for the account of New York Bank. New York Bank's
records in turn show that it holds part of those shares for the account of
European ICSD, organized, let us say, under Belgian law. European ICSD's
books show that part of its position is held for French Bank, located in
Paris. French Bank's books show that part of its pOSition is held for the
account of Australian Investor.
Discussing these problems in the context of hypotheticals presents a
subtle but quite significant obstacle to understanding the issues. When we
discuss such hypotheticals, it is easy to lose sight of a simple question.
How do we know the information about the chain of holdings described
above? The answer is that the facts are simply stipulated.
Let us shift to the messy world of reality.19 Suppose that Australian
17. See Benjamin Geva, Legislative Power in Relation to Transfers of Securities: The
Case for Provincialjurisdietion in Canada, 19 BANKING &: FIN. L. REV. 393 (2004).
18. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12.
19. The following presentation is a shortened version of the discussion set out in
James Steven Rogers, Of Normalcy and Anomaly: Thoughts on Choice of Law for the Indi-
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Investor wishes to borrow money from Australian Bank and offers as collat-
eral the securities positions that it holds through the account with French
Bank. Imagine the task that would confront Lawyer asked by Australian
Bank to implement the transaction. If this is Lawyer's first venture into
such transactions, he might naively ask Australian Investor to bring the
certificates to the office so that he can examine them. Quickly, though,
Lawyer will learn that the only records of Australian Investor's position are
the periodic account statements Australian Investor receives from French
Bank. Lawyer now makes a phone call to France to speak with the person
at French Bank who handles Australian Investor's account. Lawyer says,
"My client tells me that he leaves his securities with you, could you please
fax me a copy of the certificates?" After some difficulties in finding some-
one who understands what Lawyer is talking about, Lawyer eventually suc-
ceeds in learning that all of the securities of Illinois Issuer held by French
Bank for its own account and for its customers are carried through an
account with European ICSD.
Lawyer still has no useful information to permit even an intelligent
guess about the governing law under the "look through" approach. Rather,
the task that Lawyer faced with respect to French Bank is replicated with
respect to European ICSD. Lawyer must somehow find out how European
ICSD holds its position. Actually, it understates the task to suggest that
Lawyer must start all over asking European ICSD the questions previously
put to French Bank. In the dealings with French Bank, Lawyer could at
least insist that he was representing a client who was a customer of French
Bank. At European ICSD, Lawyer is asking questions on behalf of some-
one who is a total stranger. European ICSD's records do not show any
customer by the name of "Australian Investor." All that European ICSD's
records show is an account for French Bank. Why would anyone at Euro-
pean ICSD be willing to answer any questions for Lawyer? But, let us press
on and assume that Lawyer somehow learns that European ICSD holds
through an account with New York Bank.
By now, the reader can easily fill in the script of Lawyer's phone calls
to New York Bank, but let us continue with the assumption that Lawyer's
budget of time and phone charges is limitless so that he ultimately learns
that all of New York Bank's position is held through an account at DTC,
and that DTC's position is recorded in the records of Illinois Inc. in the
form of a "jumbo" certificate representing all of the units of Illinois Issuer's
securities held through DTC. Now, at long last, Lawyer would seem to have
found the source of the factual information needed to decide how an Aus-
tralian court would decide the conflict of laws issue. "All" that Lawyer
needs to do is examine the certificate to see whether it is the type of writing
that is treated as a complete reification, such that the location of the certifi-
cate is the key, or the type of writing that is treated as mere evidence of
title, such that the jurisdiction of the issuer is the key. Alas, in practice
reet Holding System, in The Oxford Colloquium on Collateral and Conflict of Laws, held at
St.John's College, Oxford University, May 1, 1998, published as a special supplement to
13 BUTTERwoRTHsj. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 47-51 (1998).
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Lawyer may find that the problem has shifted from the realm of factual
impracticality to that of logical impossibility. In a common form of
arrangement between a clearing corporation and transfer agents, a single
certificate represents the aggregate holdings of the clearing corporation
and on its face says only that the clearing corporation is the holder of
record of the indicated number of shares as noted in the computerized
accounting records maintained by the transfer agent. Whether that consti-
tutes a certificated or uncertificated security is a question upon which one
could imagine learned disagreement.20
Thus far, we have explored the plausibility of actually trying to apply
the "look through" approach on the assumption that there is indeed a sin-
gle simple chain of securities holding at each level from Australian Investor
to Illinois Inc. Determining the facts needed to trace that path might be
extremely difficult, but at least if we had access to all the relevant facts, we
would probably be able to decide what route to pursue. That confidence,
however, may be nothing more than a product of the artificial simplicity of
our assumed hypothetical. At each step in our path, we have assumed that
there is a single answer to the question of how this entity holds its position.
Thus, we have assumed that all of French Bank's position was held through
an account with European ICSD, that all of European ICSD's position was
held through an account with New York Bank, that all of New York Bank's
position was held through DTC, and that all DTC's position was held
through a single jumbo certificate or entry on the books of Illinois Inc.
There is no reason to believe that will always be the case.
Suppose the position that Australian Investor wishes to pledge to Aus-
tralian Lender is $100,000 worth of debt securities and that these bonds
were issued by Illinois Inc. some years ago, in the era when debt securities
were commonly represented by definitive bearer certificates issued in rela-
tively small denominations. Over time, the great bulk of the certificates
have come to be lodged in the vaults of DTC but there are still some certifi-
cates held by individuals or by firms. Suppose that in the aggregate,
French Bank holds $10,000,000 worth of Illinois Issuer bonds.
$9,500,000 of that position is held in the fashion described above: through
accounts with European ICSD, New York Bank, and DTC, ultimately repre-
sented by bearer certificates located in DTC's vault in New York. But, sup-
pose that French Bank has found that some of its customers and
counterparties want to take physical delivery of this issue. French Bank
therefore keeps some certificates in inventory so that it can readily supply
them as needed. Hence, French Bank's $10,000,000 position is held in two
parts: (1) $9,500,000 through the accounts with European ICSD, New York
Bank, and DTC seriatim, and (2) $500,000 in bearer certificates in its own
vault in France. The choice of how French Bank holds the position has
nothing to do with the identity or particular positions of its custodial cus-
20. Indeed, at one point during the course of the Article 8 revision project in the
United States, Professor Mooney, one of the principal participants in the drafting pro-
cess, aptly observed that questions of this sort lie more within the expertise of a faculty
of theology than of law.
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tomers, such as Australian Investor. Rather, French Bank simply makes a
business judgment about the most convenient method of holding its aggre-
gate position so that it will best be able to settle whatever transactions may
occur from time to time.
Consider the task faced by Lawyer in seeking the information needed
to predict how an Australian court would apply the lex situs rule. Lawyer
needs to determine the location of the certificate that represents Australian
Investor's $100,000 pOSition. If Australian Investor's $100,000 position is
"part of' the $500,000 held by French Bank in physical form in its vault in
France, then our transaction is governed by French law. If Australian
Investor's $100,000 position is "part of' the $9,500,000 held by French
Bank through the accounts with European ICSD, New York Bank, and DTC
seriatim, then our transaction is governed by New York law. But at this
point, no amount of factual investigation will supply an answer. There is
no answer to the question whether the Australian Investor's position is part
of one mass or the other. The question is not factually difficult, it is meta-
physically absurd.
N. Achieving Neutrality-Conflicts Issues Versus Substantive Issues
If we are to achieve a workable approach to conflict of laws for securi-
ties held through intermediaries, there is no realistic alternative to an
approach under which the applicable law is determined by factors relating
solely to the relationship between the intermediary and the account holder.
In the drafting process for the Hague Convention, consensus on that basic
approach was achieved quite early. It is, however, important to bear in
mind that we are dealing only with the conflict of laws analysis.
Keeping the conflict of laws issues separate from the substantive law
issues is made somewhat more difficult by the fact that there is a strong
similarity between the principal options for a conflicts rule and the princi-
pal options for substantive law.21 In some jurisdictions the substantive
law describes the investor's property interest as a package of rights against
the intermediary and the property held by the intermediary. In other juris-
dictions, the substantive law describes the investor's property interest as a
direct interest in the underlying securities, treating all of the intermediaries
as legally transparent, under concepts of agency, bailment, trust, etc. In
some ways, that difference in the substantive law mirrors the difference in
conflict of laws between the "look through" and the PRIMA approaches.
That is, in a jurisdiction that describes the account holder's substantive
property rights as a package of rights against the intermediary and the
property held by the intermediary, it seems quite natural to adopt a con-
flict of laws approach under which the applicable law is determined by
factors limited to the arrangement between the intermediary and the
account holder. By contrast, in a jurisdiction whose substantive law
describes the account holder's interest as a direct property interest in the
21. For a comprehensive survey of the variety of approaches taken to the substantive
law of indirect securities holding, see CROSS BORDER COLLATERAL supra note 4.
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underlying securities, it seems much more plausible to adopt a conflict of
laws approach under which the applicable law is determined by factors
concerning the underlying securities.
The question then arises whether adoption of the Hague Convention
can really be neutral as to the substantive law. Suppose it were the case
that the Hague Convention could work well only in jurisdictions where the
substantive law describes the account holder's property interests as a pack-
age of rights against the intermediary and the property held by the inter-
mediary. That is, suppose that jurisdictions where the substantive law
describes the account holder's interest as a direct property interest in the
underlying securities would have considerable difficulty operating under
the Hague Convention. If that were the case, then the project to draft a
pure conflict of laws convention has failed.
It is important to bear in mind that the reason for selecting PRIMA
over the "look through" approach is not that the investor's property interest
really is better described as a package of rights against the intermediary.
That is a matter of substantive law. If one limits attention to conflict of
laws, there is a certain appeal to describing the problem in a way that
seems to limit the shift needed in traditional approaches to conflict of laws.
Traditional conflicts rules tell us that the issues of proprietary rights that
are the subject of the Hague Convention are determined by the location of
the property-lex situs. Yet if that principle is applied to the underlying
securities, one ends up with a completely unworkable approach. So, as an
initial matter, one considers shifting from an approach that regards the
relevant property as the underlying securities to an approach that regards
the relevant property as the account. Now, without any change in basic
concepts or principles of conflict of laws, one can achieve a sensible result
that remains consistent with lex situs.
But, if one says that all that is needed to solve the conflict of laws
problem is a redescription of the nature of the property, then one has
stepped across the line separating the conflict of laws questions from the
substantive law questions. To a lawyer from a jurisdiction where the sub-
stantive law regards the property interest of the investor as a package of
rights against and interests in the property held by the intermediary, it
seems only natural to say that the conflict of laws analysis should focus on
the investor-intermediary relationship. This is, after all, what such a lawyer
would say is really the investor's property interest. But the matter would
not seem so simple to a lawyer from a legal system in which the substantive
law treats the investor as having some form of direct interest in the under-
lying securities. It would seem jarring at the least to say to that lawyer,
"You can keep your substantive law; you just have to acknowledge that it is
fundamentally wrong, because the property really is the account, and that's
why the conflicts rule should be determined by reference to the account."
That is not the basis of the Hague Convention project. The project was
careful to preserve the line between conflict of laws issues and substantive
law issues. The reason for the conflict of laws approach taken in the Con-
vention is not that one view of the substantive law is better than the other.
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Rather, the reason for the Hague Convention project is that, viewed purely
as a matter of conflict of laws, the approach of determining the substantive
law by facts limited to the investor~intermediaryrelationship is the only
approach that can work in the modern .world.
It may be useful to consider in some detail how the Hague Convention
works without regard to the nature of the substantive law. Suppose that
Able, located in Atlantis, wishes to transfer an interest in certain indirectly-
held securities to Baker, located in Batavia. Before the transaction, Able
maintains its securities in an account with Atlantis Firm. Baker maintains
its securities in an account with Batavian Firm. Accordingly, the transac-
tion is implemented by having the securities transferred from Able's
account with Atlantis Firm to Baker's account with Batavian Bank. The
transaction between Atlantis Firm and Batavian Bank is settled by debits
and credits on the books of Securities DepOSitory, located in Ruritania.
Consider legal risks that the transaction might pose. First, suppose
that another party, Claimant, asserts that it, not Able, was the true owner
of the securities and that its ownership interest can be asserted against
Baker. The issue is whether Claimant's interest can be asserted against
Baker, or whether Baker is protected under adverse claim cut-off rules of
the sort commonly referred to as "bona fide purchaser" rules. A second
type of legal issue would be whether the transaction has been properly
effectuated so that the property interest in question has effectively been
transferred from Able to Baker. That issue is most likely to be significant
for pledges, since the law of pledge varies considerably from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
Now, consider the conflict of laws analysis that would apply to either
of these two issues. Under the Hague Convention, both the question
whether the pledge is effective and the question whether Claimant can
assert an adverse claim against the transferee are governed by the law of
the securities intermediary's jurisdiction. Thus, in our example, both
issues are determined under Batavian law.
Consider how that approach to conflicts meshes with the substantive
law. First, suppose that the substantive law determined under the Hague
Convention-the law of Batavia in our example-describes the investor's
property interest as a package of rights against the intermediary and the
property held by the intermediary. Both the adverse claim issue and the
effectiveness of pledge issue are likely to be resolved in a fairly simple fash-
ion in such a jurisdiction. The question whether Baker takes free from or
subject to Claimant's interest can presumably be answered solely by exami-
nation of the facts concerning the arrangement between Baker and its
intermediary, Batavian Bank.22
22. For example, under United States law, an adverse claim cannot be asserted
against any person who acquired a security entitlement for value and without notice of
the adverse claim. U.e.e. § 8-502 (2004). An investor acquires a security entitlement
when investor's intermediary credits the position to the investor's securities account.
u.e.e. § 8-501(b)(l) (2004).
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Now suppose that Batavian substantive law describes the account
holder's interest as a direct property interest in the underlying securities.
Under that form of substantive law, a lawyer might have to analyze the
series of steps that resulted in the securities being credited to Baker's secur-
ities account. It would probably strike the Batavian lawyer as odd to imag-
ine that such issues could be answered solely by asking questions about
the Batavian Bank-Baker aspect of the transaction, without giving any con-
sideration to the prior stages in the series of events, beginning with the acts
of Able directing its intermediary, Atlantis Firm, to initiate the transfer.
The Batavian lawyer may say that neither the question whether Baker takes
free from adverse claims, nor the question whether Baker has received an
effective security interest can be answered without considering the Able
side of the transaction.23
Thus, under Batavian substantive law, one must analyze all of the
events from Able to Baker. First, one analyzes the step in which Able gave
the instructions to Atlantis Firm. Second, one analyzes the step in which
Atlantis firm gave the instruction to Securities Depository in Ruritania to
move the designated quantity of securities from the account of Atlantis
Firm to the account of Batavian Firm. Third, one analyzes the step in
which Securities Depository in Ruritania credited the securities to Batavian
Firm's account. Finally, one analyzes the step in which Batavian Firm
credited the securities to Baker's account. Presumably the same steps are
required in the analysis under Batavian substantive law of the question
whether Baker received an effective pledge from Able.
The fact that Batavian substantive law requires that each step in the
transaction be analyzed is not relevant to the conflict of laws analysis. The
Hague Convention provides that Batavian substantive law determines
whether Baker takes free from or subject to any adverse claims and whether
Baker has received an effective pledge. The Hague Convention says nothing
about how Batavian substantive law is to determine those issues. It is
entirely up to Batavian substantive law to decide whether those questions
can be answered solely by reference to facts concerning the relationship
between Batavian Firm and Baker, or whether those questions can be
answered only by considering other steps that resulted in the credit of the
securities to Baker's account with Batavian Firm. Even if Batavian substan-
tive law says that the questions cannot be answered without considering
23. Personally, I am somewhat skeptical of the contention that under any form of
substantive law the question whether Baker takes free from of subject to adverse claims
cannot be answered without considering the Able side of the transaction. As is noted
below, see infra text accompanying note 62, in the routine transaction in which securi-
ties are purchased in an ordinary market transaction, the buyer will have absolutely no
information about the identity of the seller. Thus, if it were really true that one could
not decide whether a buyer got good title without analyzing the seller side of the transac-
tion, then one would be forced to the conclusion that no one ever knows whether a
buyer receives good title in an ordinary market transaction. But, for purposes of this
article, it is unnecessary to consider whether there really are any countries whose law
takes this form. Rather, we can consider the conflict of laws issues on the assumption
that there are such countries.
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the steps involving Able, Atlantis Firm, and Securities Depository, the
Hague Convention provides that all of those questions are to be deter-
mined under the substantive law oj Batavia. The Hague Convention says
that the legal issue is determined by Batavian substantive law. It says noth-
ing about whatJacts Batavian law will consider in resolving that legal issue.
An easy way to express the result of application of the Hague Convention in
this case is to say that once the Hague Convention has determined that
Batavian substantive law applies, the issue is resolved in the same fashion
as Batavian law would resolve the issue if all of the relevant events and facts
took place within Batavia, and it is up to Batavian substantive law to decide
what events and facts are relevant.
Part of the potential confusion on this point may be attributable to the
same problem that has been encountered before. The explanatory materi-
als accompanying the Hague Convention necessarily discuss, at a fairly
abstract level, the question of which law applies to a variety of questions. A
common description that one will find in explanations of the application of
the Hague Convention to our hypothetical transaction proceeds more or
less as follows: 24 under the Hague Convention, the relationship between
Able and Atlantis Firm is governed by the law of the securities intermedi-
ary's jurisdiction, presumably that of Atlantis. The relationship between
Atlantis Firm and Securities Depository, and the relationship between
Batavian Firm and Securities Depository, is governed by the law of the
securities intermediary's jurisdiction, presumably that of Ruritania. The
relationship between Batavian Firm and Baker is governed by the law of
the securities intermediary's jurisdiction, presumably that of Batavia.
From such a description one might be misled into thinking that if Batavian
substantive law says that a question about Baker's rights requires analysis
of prior stages in the transaction, then a court applying Batavian law could
not answer the question without considering the law of Atlantis and
Ruritania. But, that is not what the Hague Convention says.
The litigation that we are imagining is not a case in which everyone
that might have been involved in the chain of events is suing everyone else.
Rather, one must consider a specific lawsuit posing a specific issue. We
have been thinking of two such cases. In the first, Claimant brings an
action against Baker asserting that Baker is obligated to Claimant because
Baker now has an item of property in which Claimant has superior rights.
In the second, an insolvency proceeding concerning Able is pending, and a
dispute has arisen between Able's insolvency administrator and Baker
about whether Baker's claim of rights as a pledgee is or is not to be
respected.
Here, we are not considering a lawsuit between Able and Atlantis
Firm. We are not considering a lawsuit between Atlantis Firm and Securi-
ties DepOSitory. We are not considering a lawsuit between Securities
Depository and Batavian Firm. We are not considering a lawsuit between
Batavian Firm and Baker. If we were imagining any such lawsuit, then we
24. See, e.g., Pre!. Doc. No.1, supra note 5, at 37 -38.
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would proceed through the analysis of conflict of laws and then substan-
tive law for that lawsuit. But the Hague Convention, like any conflict of
laws rule, necessarily treats the question of what jurisdiction's law applies
to a specific lawsuit. Neither this, nor any other conflicts rule can ever
answer, in the abstract, the question of what jurisdiction's law applies to "a
transaction."2s Rather, we must first consider who is suing whom for
what. Only then can we decide which jurisdiction's law should be applied
to that dispute.
Once one understands this fundamental point, one can see that the
Hague Convention solution to the conflict of laws question truly is neutral
on the substantive law. One begins by identifying the specific legal issue
being considered. In the previous example, that is either an assertion by
Claimant that Baker now has an item of property in which Claimant has
superior rights, or a dispute in Able's insolvency proceeding about whether
Baker's claim of rights as a pledgee is to be respected. Under the Hague
Convention, questions about Baker's rights are determined under the law
of Baker's securities intermediary's jurisdiction, that is, Batavia. Once that
determination has been made, the conflict of laws analysis is concluded.
One then turns to the substantive law of Batavia. That substantive law will
determine what facts are relevant to the analysis of the legal issues. Bata-
vian substantive law might say that the question can be answered by con-
sidering only facts about the relationship between Batavian Firm and
Baker. Or, Batavian substantive law might say that the question cannot be
answered without considering other facts, such as facts about the relation-
ships between Able and Atlantis firm, between Atlantis Firm and Securities
Depository, or between Securities Depository and Batavian Firm. So far as
the Hague Convention is concerned, it makes no difference what facts
Batavian law deems relevant. That is a question of substantive law. But,
the Hague Convention does mean that once any court in a jurisdiction
where the Convention is in force has decided that Batavian substantive law
applies, that court will decide all the questions made relevant by Batavian
substantive law in accordance with Batavian substantive law, regardless of
whether those facts concerned events that took place in Batavia or
elsewhere.
V. Determining the Intermediary's Jurisdiction-the Hard Part
The most important conceptual shift made by the Hague Convention
is the move from the approach that would determine the applicable law by
reference to the location of the underlying securities to a1;1 approach that
would determine the applicable law by reference solely to factors concern-
ing the relationship between the investor and the intermediary. That is a
shift that is, in essence, dictated by necessity. Under modern conditions,
the "look through" approach is simply not feasible. At first blush, it would
seem that the hard step is rejecting "look through" and agreeing upon
25. As discussed in more detail below, see infra text accompanying notes 61-62, the
notion that there is a single "transaction" in such a case is itself quite problematic.
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"PRIMA." Then, one has only to deal with the detail of specifying what
counts as the relevant law determined by reference to the relationship
between the investor and its intermediary. Alas, that matter of detail
proves to be remarkably difficult.
A. The "Account Approach"
The early drafts of the Hague Convention followed what might be
termed the "location of account" approach. The draft produced at the first
full session ofthe Working Group of Experts at The Hague inJanuary 2001
provided that the matters covered by the Convention were to be determined
by the law of the place of the "relevant securities intermediary"26 and then
stated that that place was "the place where the securities account is main-
tained."27 The appeal of the "account approach" is that it seems to provide
a way of describing the Hague Convention that makes it consistent with
traditional conflict of laws principles. One can retain the basic concept
that the governing law is determined by the location of the property-the
traditional lex situs rule-and merely shift the identification of the relevant
property from the underlying securities to the securities account.28
However, there is a problem. An account does not have a location.
Period. There is no way around that fact. An account is an abstract legal
relationship between two entities. Abstract relationships do not have loca-
tions. Consider another old conflicts problem-whose law determines the
validity of a marriage. There are many ways of resolving that problem. But
there is one approach that would make absolutely no sense: decide the
conflict of laws question by deciding where the marriage is located. People
have locations, though they change those locations quite frequently.
Events, like marriage ceremonies, take place at locations, but marriages do
not have locations. Neither do accounts.
Thus, the "account approach" is fundamentally flawed, and some
other approach must be found. Unfortunately, the law in at least one
major area of the world, the European Union, has been caught in the trap
produced by what initially seemed like an appealing approach to conflicts
in the Hague Convention drafting process. At the same time that the
Hague Convention process was ongoing, the European Union undertook
several related initiatives. The Settlement Finality Directive of 199829 gov-
erning certain pledges of indirectly-held securities provides that the law
governing the pledge is to be the law of the jurisdiction where the "register,
account or centralised deposit system [is)located."30 Similarly, the Collat-
26. Pre!. Doc. No. 13, supra note 5, art. 3.
27. Id. art. 4(1).
28. That approach, however, is inconsistent with the important principle that the
Hague Convention must be neutral on the substantive law characterization of indirect
securities holding. See supra Part IV.
29. Council Directive 98/26, Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities Settle-
ment Systems, 1998 OJ. (L 166) (EC).
30. Id. art. 9(2).
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eral Directive of 200231 provides that questions concerning pledges cov-
ered by the Directive "shall be governed by the law of the country in which
the relevant account is maintained."32 Both formulations essentially come
to the same point: the governing law is that of the jurisdiction where "the
account" is located.
Yet as the Hague Convention work proceeded, it became apparent that
it simply made no sense to speak of the location of an "account" or even the
location where the account is "maintained." The annoying reality is that
abstract relations simply do not have a location. Thus, at present, the law
in the European Union is stuck in the situation of having adopted a con-
flict of laws rule that those who have examined the matter carefully have
determined simply will not work.
B. The "Branch/Office Approach"
The conceptual and practical problems with the account approach led
the Hague project to develop an alternative that came to be known as the
"branch/office approach." Under this approach, the governing law would
be determined by the location of the branch or office of the intermediary
that actually carried out the functions of maintaining the account. As was
explained by the Permanent Bureau in mid-200l:
Because an account is an intangible legal relationship, it cannot, literally,
have a geographical location. Rather, in speaking of the location of an
account, one typically has in mind particular activities that an intermediary
carries out in connection with maintaining the legal relationship of a securi-
ties account. Although stating the rules on governing law in terms of loca-
tion of an account may provide the easiest route of transition from
traditional lex rei sitae rules for simple certificated securities held directly, it
may be that retaining the concept of geographical location of an account
causes more difficulties than it solves.33
Although the "branch/office approach" avoids the metaphysical
absurdity of trying to specify the location of an account, it cannot eliminate
serious practical problems. To be sure, in some cases it may be relatively
easy to identify the location of the office that maintains the account. But it
would make no sense to adopt an approach to conflict of laws that would
only work in the simplest cases. Operations of intermediaries in the mod-
ern world are dispersed across many jurisdictions. The Explanatory Report
contains a good illustration of the problem:
In modern global trading, the various activities involved in the maintenance
of securities accounts are indeed often dispersed among offices in different
countries. By way of illustration, assume an intermediary incorporated
under the laws of the State of New York agreed with its client that the client's
securities account is maintained in Tokyo because it is the place where the
account was initially opened and where the first credit of securities to the
31. Council Directive 2002/47, Financial Collateral Arrangements, 2002 0.]. (L
168) (Ee).
32. ld. art. 9.
33. Pre!. Doc. No.3, supra note 5, at 13.
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account was effected. The intermediary sends all its account statements to
the client from an office in Dublin. The client receives dividends adminis-
tered and sent from an office in Hong Kong and obtains advice as to the
ongoing status of the account from an office near the client's main office in
Singapore. All the intermediary's operations relating to each of its securities
accounts (including the entries effectuated) are backed-up and monitored by
two separate computer systems run from its New Delhi and San Francisco
offices respectively. Finally, the client regularly accesses the information
relating to the relevant securities account from a laptop while travelling
around the world.
In such a situation, if the criterion for determining the applicable law
were the location of the securities account or the location of the office where
the securities account is maintained, no certainty could be achieved and
such a test would invite litigation in which courts would be required to make
fact-intensive inquiries. The risks and burdens presented to a potential col-
lateral taker are readily apparent.34
Given this reality, the project faced the difficulty of specifying how one
is to determine which branch or office should be considered as the one
that maintains the account. Theoretically, the Convention might simply
have refused to provide any guidance on that issue. The Convention would
just say that the governing law is determined by the location of the office
or branch that maintains the account, leaving it to surmise and litigation to
determine how one decides what counts as maintaining an account. At
one point, motivated by what might be termed a combination of frustra-
tion and puckishness, the Drafting Committee actually listed this as one
possible option. The draft produced at the Drafting Committee meeting in
Brussels in December 2001, listed three options for a rule, the last of which
was: "The place of the relevant intermediary is the place of the office or
branch that the account holder and the relevant intermediary have agreed
will maintain the securities account, provided that the securities account is in
fact held by that office or branch."35 Not surprisingly, no one took that
tongue-in-cheek proposal seriously. Rather, the project struggled with the
task of finding some way of specifying the office or branch that maintains
the account.
Another approach would be to attempt some listing of the activities
that do and do not count as maintaining the account. Perhaps one might
have some success with specifying certain activities that do not in them-
selves count as maintaining an account, such as maintaining back-up com-
puter facilities, but the affirmative task would be far more difficult.
Realistically, any listing of activities that supposedly constitute mainte-
nance of an account is bound to be incomplete or inaccurate. That is true
even if one confines attention to current practices. If one wishes to draft a
convention that has any prospect of enduring vitality, the task is hopeless.
Change is perhaps the only constant in the various methods of maintain-
ing business information.
34. EXPlANATORY REpORT, supra note 6, at 20.
35. Pre!. Doc. No.7, supra note 5, art. 4, Option Z (emphasis added).
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C. Agreement
One approach to the problem would be for the Convention to allow an
agreement between the intermediary and investor to specify which jurisdic-
tion would count as the intermediary's jurisdiction. In the strongest ver-
sion of that approach, the agreement would be conclusive, that is, there
would be no further inquiry into the extent or nature of the activities of the
intermediary in that location. That approach was laid out as an option in
one of the drafts produced by the Drafting Committee,36 but it never
attracted sufficient support to become a viable option. Rather, as is
described below, the approach taken in the Convention was to give effect to
an agreement only if the jurisdiction selected met certain other tests, which
came to be known as the "reality test."
Before turning to the approach ultimately adopted in the Convention,
it is important to be clear on what such a pure agreement approach would
and would not entail. In that regard, the terminology commonly used in
discussion of other issues of conflict of laws can be rather problematic.
When speaking of the law that governs a bilateral relationship, it is com-
mon to use a phrase such as "party autonomy" to refer to an approach that
permits the parties to that relationship specify the law that governs their
rights and duties. But, the phrase "party autonomy" is quite misleading in
the context of the issues governed by the Hague Convention.
The basic situation covered by the Convention involves three parties.
For simplicity, let us consider a pledge transaction, so that the parties
would be Borrower, Lender, and Intermediary. The phrase "party auton-
omy" suggests that Borrower and Lender could select the law governing the
transaction and that selection would be binding upon third parties. No
one ever suggested this, and the final text of the Convention does not adopt
any such approach. Rather the suggestion was that in deciding what
counts as the intermediary's jurisdiction, effect, conclusive or partial,
should be given to an agreement between the intermediary and the account
holder. That is a very different thing from any suggestion that an account
holder and a transferee can agree on the law that will affect third parties'
rights. Under the approach of allowing an agreement between an account
holder and its intermediary to determine the intermediary's jurisdiction,
once the intermediary and the investor have agreed upon the governing
law, that law would determine the proprietary effects of transactions
effected on the books of that intermediary. If Borrower is borrowing from
Lender, and granting Lender a security interest in positions held through
Intermediary, the law selected in the agreement between Borrower and
Intermediary determines the effectiveness of the pledge, regardless of
whether the Lender likes that or not.
Part of the objection to a pure agreement approach may be attributable
to a fear that if the intermediary and account holder could specify the
intermediary's jurisdiction by agreement, then an intermediary might,
willy-nilly, enter into lots of different agreements with different customers
36. rd. art. 4, Option X.
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specifying lots of different jurisdictions. That is probably an unrealistic
concern. Suppose, for example, that a plausible argument could be made
that the activities of the intermediary that constitute maintenance of the
account occur in three jurisdictions. It is easy to see that the intermediary
would select the law of one of these three. Is it plausible to suppose that
the intermediary would select the law of some other completely unrelated
jurisdiction? Hardly. After all, by entering into the agreement the interme-
diary is, in effect, admitting that it has some contact to that jurisdiction.
That being so, any competent lawyer advising the intermediary would fear
that by agreeing to the law of a certain jurisdiction for purposes of the
Hague Convention, the intermediary is running the risk of subjecting itself
to the jurisdiction of regulatory authorities in that jurisdiction. No sensi-
ble intermediary is going to take such action lightly. Nor is it plausible to
suppose that any careful intermediary would blithely enter into agreements
with different customers specifying different jurisdictions' laws to govern
their relationships. The whole point of having standardized agreements is
to simplify legal analysis. Why would a competent intermediary enter into
agreements with different customers specifying different governing law,
when by doing so it is multiplying its own legal costs and uncertainties?
D. Agreement plus "Reality Test"
Whatever arguments might be advanced in favor of an approach that
permitted unrestricted selection of governing law, that approach never had
any realistic chance of success in the Hague Convention project. Although
the delegation of the United States from time to time mentioned that possi-
bility, it was always fairly clear that the suggestion could not garner suffi-
cient support to be a viable option. Accordingly, virtually all of the work in
the drafting process was concentrated on a different approach, which came
to be known as "agreement plus reality test." In essence, the approach is to
say that an agreement specifying the governing law is effective only if the
jurisdiction selected bears a sufficient relationship to the activities of the
intermediary. The difficulty, of course, is filling in the details of what
counts as a sufficient relationship.
The initial thought for a reality test drew upon the fact that the activity
of maintaining securities accounts tends to be subject to regulatory author-
ity. Various early drafts said that a selection of governing law is effective
provided that the intermediary's activities of maintaining the account, or
accounts generally, is subject to regulatory supervision in the jurisdiction
selected.37 The difficulty is that patterns of regulatory supervision vary so
37. In the first full draft, produced at the January 2001 meeting in The Hague, the
test was that a selection of law was effective provided that at that place "the securities
intermediary has an office or branch and the securities intermediary allocates the secur-
ities account to that office or branch for purposes of reporting to its account holders or
for regulatory, tax or accounting purposes." Pre!. Doc. No.2, supra note 5, art. 4(2).
A more precise formulation was set out in the draft produced by the Drafting Commit-
tee at its meeting in Paris in May, 2001. Under that approach, the selection would be
effective provided that "the intermediary's maintenance of the securities account is sub-
ject to regulatory supervision in the place so agreed," or, in a slightly different test,
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significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction that it proved infeasible to
formulate any form of regulatory nexus test that was both sufficiently pre-
cise to have any real content and sufficiently flexible to accommodate all
existing patterns of regulation. Ultimately, it was concluded that any form
of regulatory nexus test was flawed. Perhaps the best explanation for this
conclusion is found in comments submitted by the Association of German
Banks:
In principle, it is to be welcomed that another tangible element must exist
alongside the presence of an office or branch. Supervision of the mainte-
nance of the account is not a suitable criterion, however, and should there-
fore be dropped. . . . Custodians who are active on a cross-border basis, in
particular, are often subject to the supervision of several countries. In the
European Union, solvency supervision is normally determined by the home
country and market supervision by the host country, though a certain
amount of overlap cannot be excluded. On top of that, the creation of the
European single market for financial services may also result in the estab-
lishment of a pan-European regulatory authority. Reference to the supervi-
sory situation when determining the .applicable law therefore introduces an
element of uncertainty. The parties involved in dispositions of securities
would first have to clarify comprehensively which authority was responsible
for supervision-assuming that complete clarification of this point would be
at all possible. Furthermore, it seems incongruous to make the PIL issue of
determining the law applicable to a cross-border situation dependent on a
previous clarification of supervisory questions. Determining the relevant
location on the basis of regulatory criteria is therefore to be fundamentally
rejected.38
Once the regulatory nexus approach was dropped, it was necessary to
devise some other form of reality test. The basic drafting structure ulti-
mately followed in the Convention had its origins in the draft produced at
the Special Commission meeting in The Hague in January 2002. In that
draft, the basic rule, set out in Article 4(2), was that a selection of the gov-
erning law would be effective only if the intermediary "has an office within
that State engaged in a business or other regular activity of maintaining
securities accounts...."39
Standing alone, that general rule was thought to pose an unacceptable
high risk of uncertainty. Thus, another Article set out a fairly extensive
"safe harbor" list of activities that would constitute "engaging the business
of maintaining accounts."40 That extensive "white list," however, was
added late in the Special Commission meeting in January 2002, and was
provided that the place selected "is a place where the intermediary is subject to regula-
tory supervision." Pre!. Doc. No.3, supra note 5, at 14.
For another variation on this basic theme, see Pre!. Doc. No.6, supra note 5, at 7-9.
38. Pre!. Doc. No.5, supra note 5, at 30.
39. Pre!. Doc. No.8, supra note 5, an. 4(2). As is the case in the final version, the test
is satisfied if the office in question either itself is engaged in that business, or does so
together with other offices of the intermediary in that or another State. Id.
40. Id. Article 4 bis(l) provided that that the "reality test" would be satisfied if the
agreed office engaged in any of the following activities:
(a) contracts regarding securities accounts are executed at such office or
received by such office;
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intended more as a "place holder" for a concept to be further developed
than as an actual drafting suggestion.41
Discussions of the "white list" continued in a variety of fora through-
out the 2002 year. 42 The result of those discussions was a dramatic short-
ening of the "white list." By the time of the drafting of the final text at the
December 2002 meeting at The Hague, the "white list" was down to two
specific elements:
effects or monitors entries to securities accounts; or
administers payments or corporate actions relating to securities held with
the intermediary;43
With the "white list" so significantly shortened, a drafting simplification
was made. Rather than state the general rule of "engaging in the business
of maintaining accounts" in one section and then following that with
another section setting out a non-exclusive "white list" or "safe harbor" rule
in another section, the two different sorts of rules were combined into a
single provision in Article 4(l)(a). That provision states that the applicable
law is the law of the jurisdiction agreed on by the intermediary and
account holder, provided that the intermediary has an office in the State
selected and that that office
(a) alone or together with other offices of the relevant intermediary or with
other persons acting for the relevant intermediary in that or another
State -
(i) effects or monitors entries to securities accounts;
(ii) administers payments or corporate actions relating to securities
held with the intermediary; or
(b) account holders can communicate with the intermediary at such office with
regard to securities accounts;
(c) legal, regulatory, auditing, position monitoring, or account-holder-support
functions of the intermediary relating to securities accounts occur at such
office;
(d) account statements bear an address of that office or are prepared at that
office;
(e) entries to a securities account by the intermediary are made, stored, or man-
aged at that office, such as the booking, recording, transferring, or pledging of
interests in securities;
(f) technology supporting bookkeeping or data processing for securities
accounts is located at such office;
(g) a single account number, bank code, or other means of identification exists
that identifies such office as maintaining securities accounts a~ that office;
(h) ...
41. As was explained by the Permanent Bureau, "due to lack of time Art. 4 bis had
not been discussed extensively by the Plenary in January 2002 and was merely inserted
so as to provide the basis for further consideration. Against this background, the Spe-
cial Commission mandated the Drafting Committee to assess this preliminary version of
Art. 4 bis and, if needed, to submit new suggestions." Prel. Doc. No. 10, supra note 5, at
7 n.1.
42. See id.; Pre!. Doc No. 14, supra note 5, at 17-19; Pre!. Doc. No. 13, supra note 5;
Pre!. Doc. No. 15, supra note 5; Pre!. Doc. No. 16, supra note 5.
43. Pre!. Doc. No. 16, supra note 5, at 7.
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(iii) is otherwise engaged in a business or other regular activity of main-
taining securities accounts;44
The result is a simpler piece of text, but it is important to realize that no
substantive change was made. It remains the case that Article 4(1)(a) con-
tains two quite different rules. On the one hand, there is the general rule
under which the "reality test" is satisfied if one concludes, on the basis of a
more wide-ranging analysis, that the office is "engaged in a business ... of
maintaining securities accounts." On the other hand, there are the "safe
harbor" rules in Article 4(1)(a)(i) and (ii) under which the "reality test" is,
without any further inquiry, satisfied if the office either effects entries or
administers payments or other corporate actions.45
E. "Identification Code" Provision
Another provision of the Convention-the "identification code" provi-
sion found in Article 4(1)(b)-plays essentially the same role as the "effect-
ing entries" and "administering payments" tests listed in Article 4(1)(a)(i)
and (ii). Under Article 4(1)(b), a selection of governing law is effective
provided that the intermediary has an office in the selected State that "is
identified by an account number, bank code, or other specific means of
identification as maintaining securities accounts in that State."46 If this
"identification code" test is satisfied, there is no need to consider whether
the intermediary's office in the selected jurisdiction is "engaged in a busi-
ness or other regular activity of maintaining securities accounts."47
44. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 4(1)(a).
45. One way of seeing the difference between the specific rules in Article 4(1)(a)(i)
and (ii) and the general rule in Article 4(1)(a)(iii) is by examining the role of Article
4(2). That article provides that "for purposes of paragraph l(a)," performing various
functions, such as maintaining call centers or computer facilities, does not constitute
"engag[ingJ in a business or other regular activity of maintaining securities accounts."
Although the introductory language to Article 4(2) refers generally to "paragraph (l)(a)"
the listing in Article 4(2) speaks only to whether an office is "engaged in a business or
other regular activity of maintaining securities accounts." That question arises only if
one is relying on the general test in Article 4(1)(a)(iii). If the case falls within either of
the specific rules in Article 4(1)(a)(i) or (ii), then there is no need to consider whether
the office is or is not "engaged in a business or other regular activity of maintaining
securities accounts." Accordingly, there is no need to consider the listing of ineligible
functions in Article 4(2). Similarly, if the office in question meets the "identification
code" test in Article 4(1)(b), there is no need to consider the listing of ineligible func-
tions in Article 4(2).
46. The "identification code" provision was suggested by representatives from Ger-
many, see Pre!. Doc. No.5, supra note 5, at 31 (Comments of Association of German
Banks); id. at 45 (proposed German draft), and first appeared in the November 2001
draft, as one of a long list of possible approaches to stating some form of reality test. See
Pre!. Doc. No.6, supra note 5, at 8. It appeared throughout the various 2002 drafts as
one item on the "white list" of activities that, without more, qualified as engaging in the
business of maintaining securities accounts. See Pre!. Doc. No. B, supra note 5, at 6-7;
Pre!. Doc. No. 10, supra note 5, at 7, 17; Pre!' Doc. No. 13, supra note 5, at 6; Pre!. Doc.
No. 15, supra note 5, at 6.
47. There is a slight difference in drafting structure between the Article 4(1)(a)(i)
and (ii) "effects entries or administers payments" tests, on the one hand, and the Article
4(1)(b) "identification code" test, on the other hand. However, there appears to be no
substantive difference in the role played by between the two. Suppose that an agreement
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The "identification code" proVIsIOn presents significant interpretive
issues. Read literally, Article 4(1)(b) says that the "reality test" is satisfied
in any case where the intermediary has an office in the State whose law is
selected, and that office is "identified" by any "specific means of identifica-
tion" as "maintaining securities accounts in that State." Suppose that all of
an intermediary's activities concerning securities accounts are conducted
in Germany, and that all of the intermediary's customers are located in
Germany. Suppose, however, that the intermediary does have an office in
New York, but that the activities of the New York office are concerned
exclusively with other businesses.
The whole point of the elaborate rules of the Convention on the "real-
ity test" is that the intermediary in this example should not be permitted to
select New York law because all of the actions that might be regarded as
associated with the maintenance of the securities accounts are conducted
in Germany. Suppose, though, that the agreement between the intermedi-
ary and its customers says that the Article 2(1) issues will be governed by
New York law. Read literally, Article 4(1)(b) says that the selection of New
York law is effective as long as the New York office is "identified by an
account number, bank code, or other specific means as maintaining securi-
ties accounts in" New York. One might argue a bit about the precise mean-
ing of "account number" or "bank code," but, read literally, Article 4(1 )(b)
is satisfied as long as some "specific means" of identification designates
the New York office. If one believes that there is a significant risk that
intermediaries might select "inappropriate" jurisdictions' law, Article
4(1)(b) would seem to be the perfect vehicle for them to do so. All that the
intermediary need do is identify the New York office by some "specific
means" -whatever that may mean.
Inasmuch as, taken literally, the "identification code" provision of
Article 4(1 )(b) would vitiate the general structure of agreement plus reality
test, one can only conclude that the "identification code" provision must be
read more narrowly than its literal language. The difficulty, of course, is
figuring out how one would narrow the scope of the language. Presuma-
bly, the thought is that the association between the maintenance of the
account and the identification of "an account number, bank code, or other
specific means" reflects not simply an arbitrary action by the intermediary,
but some regular practice, perhaps reinforced or required by regulatory
selects a certain jurisdiction's law as the law governing the Article 2(1) issues, and that
the intermediary has an office in that State. The selection of governing law is effective,
without any further inquiry, if the office in question is designated by an "identification
code" pursuant to Article 4(l)(b). Alternatively, the selection of governing law is effec-
tive if the designated office (alone or with others) either "effects entries" Article
4(1)(a)(i), or "administers payments," Article 4(1)(a)(ii). If the selected office does not
meet the Article 4(1)(b) "identification code" test, it remains possible that the selection
of governing law is still effective under the general rule of Article 4(l)(a)(iii)-or even
under the other specific tests in Article 4(1)(a)(i) or (ii). Similarly, if the selected office
does not meet the "effects entries or administers payments" tests of Article 4(1)(a)(i) and
(ii), it remains possible that the selection of governing law is still effective under the
"identification code" test of Article 4(l)(b), or under the general rule of Article
4(l)(a)(iii).
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requirements. But, the text does not identify what sort of regular practice
or regulatory requirement is necessary. As was discussed above, the possi-
bility of some form of "regulatory nexus" test was considered extensively in
the drafting process, but no satisfactory language to capture that thought
was ever devised. Thus, as a matter of prudence, one might well conclude
that it is not safe to rely on the "identification code" provision in Article
4(1)(b) in any case where one would not feel confident that the office
selected would meet the general test in Article 4(1)(a)(iii), that is, the office
is "engaged in a business or other regular activity of maintaining securities
accounts."
F. Agreement Simpliciter Versus Agreed Location
One final point warrants discussion. In the early drafts of the Conven-
tion, the governing law was determined by the law of the "place of the
relevant intermediary." Then the drafts provided that the place of the rele-
vant intermediary would be deemed to be the place agreed on by the inter-
mediary and account holder, provided that the place selected met the
"reality test." In the final text of the Convention, the phrase "place of the
relevant intermediary" does not appear. Rather the governing law is deter-
mined by agreement of the intermediary and account holder, provided that
the place selected meets the "reality test." The shift is merely a matter of
drafting convenience, having no substantive effect.
The initial drafting approach could be described as follows:
Step One The governing law is determined by the law of the "place of the
relevant intermediary."
Step Two The law of the "place of the relevant intermediary" is the law
agreed on by the intermediary and account holder, provided
that the selection meets the "reality test."
As has been seen, the participants in the drafting process agreed at the
outset that the governing law should be determined by the reference to
facts solely concerning the relationship between the intermediary and
account holder. That was the meaning of the early agreement on "PRIMA,"
and corresponding rejection of "look through." Then the participants in
the drafting process struggled for several years to find a way of giving suffi-
cient certainty to the concept of "place of the relevant intermediary." As
has been seen, the conclusion was that the only way to accomplish that
objective was to state that the "place of the relevant intermediary" was
determined by agreement of the intermediary and account holder, pro-
vided that the agreement meets the "reality test." Once that decision was
reached, it became apparent that the phrase "place of the relevant interme-
diary" did not play any substantive role.
In the two-step process described above, the phrase "place of the rele-
vant intermediary" in Step One is merely a placeholder. All of the substan-
tive content is carried by the agreement plus reality test formulation set out
in Step Two. Without any change of meaning, one could substitute any
phrase one likes for "place of the relevant intermediary." Since the phrase
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itself carries no substantive significance, the drafting could be simplified
by eliminating it. Thus, the two step process described above becomes a
single step:
Step One The governing law is determined by tfie llW{ sf tfie "plaee sf tfie
rele'fant intermediary." Tfie law sf tfie "plaee sf tfie rele'fSnt
intermediary" is the law agreed on by the intermediary and
account holder, provided that the selection meets the "reality
test."
That change has no substantive significance. It is simply a drafting simpli-
fication. The advantage of the simplification is that it avoids the risk that
parties or judges called upon to interpret the Convention will read into the
phrase "place of the relevant intermediary" some substantive content that it
should not bear. The disadvantage is that a bit more care is required to
avoid the misunderstanding that the Convention has somehow adopted
party autonomy for conflicts involving third party rights.
G. Primary Rule and Fallback Rules
The essence of the basic rule, set out in Article 4 of the Convention, is
that the governing law is the law selected by the intermediary and account
holder, provided that the "reality test" is met. To be a bit more precise,
Article 4(1) provides that the matters covered by the Convention, as spelled
out in Article 2(1), are determined by "the law in force in the State
expressly agreed in the account agreement as the State whose law governs
the account agreement or, if the account agreement expressly provides that
another law is applicable to all such issues, that other law." The complex-
ity of that rule is made necessary by the possibility that the parties to an
account agreement might, in some circumstances, select the law of a cer-
tain jurisdiction as the law governing the purely "contractual" aspects of
the agreement between the intermediary and account holder, without
intending that the law of that jurisdiction should determine the "proprie-
tary" issues that are the subject of the Convention.
Under the formulation of the final text of Article 4(1), the intermedi-
ary and account holder could provide in the account agreement that the
matters listed in Article 2(1) of the Hague Convention are governed by the
law of State One, while the other aspects of the agreement are governed by
the law of State Two. That complexity is, perhaps, unfortunate, but it is
made necessary by the reality that such agreements are, in fact, common.
For example, suppose that a given jurisdiction-Atlantis-has a relatively
underdeveloped law of contract. An account agreement between an inter-
mediary located in Atlantis and its customers also located in Atlantis might
say that contractual matters that are a major subject of the agreement are to
be determined in accordance with the laws of a jurisdiction having a well-
developed contract law, such as the United Kingdom. The parties, how-
ever, would not intend by that agreement that the "proprietary" matters
covered by the Hague Convention should be determined by the laws of the
United Kingdom. Rather, they intend that those issues be governed by the
laws of Atlantis. Under the formulation of Article 4(1), the intermediary
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and account holder could provide that the matters listed in the Hague Con-
vention are governed by the law of Atlantis, while other aspects of the
agreement are governed by the law of the United Kingdom.
Note that the formulation in Article 4(1) contains the word
"expressly." That is intentional. It means that parties who wish to take
advantage of the conflicts rule set out in the Hague Convention should
have their agreements refer specifically to the Hague Convention, by lan-
guage along the lines of "it is agreed that the matters covered by Article
2(1) of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in
Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary are governed by the law of
Atlantis." The rule permits maximum certainty for agreements entered
into, or revised, after the Hague Convention becomes effective. It might,
however, pose some potential problems for agreements entered into before
the Convention becomes effective, or even agreements entered into after the
Convention becomes effective if those agreements are not carefully drafted.
To meet those needs, the Convention contains several subsidiary rules. For
pre-effective date agreements, there are a series of somewhat complex rules
set out in Article 16 of the Convention. For all agreements, whenever exe-
cuted, there is a rule in Article 5, under which a provision in an account
agreement that "expressly and unambiguously staters] that the relevant
intermediary entered into the agreement through a particular office" will
have the same effect as an express selection of the law of that jurisdiction
under Article 4.48
Even with the benefit of these rules, it is possible that agreements
between an intermediary and its account holders will not contain a provi-
sion that triggers the basic rule in Article 4. That could happen either
because the agreement did not contain the necessary selection of governing
law provision, or because the agreement did select the law of a given juris-
diction for purposes of the Convention, but that selection did not meet the
"reality test" set out in Article 4(1). In that case, Article 5(2) provides a
further fallback rule, under which the governing law is determined by the
place of incorporation of the intermediary. Finally, for the extremely
unlikely scenario of an intermediary that is not a corporation or similar
entity, Article 5(3) provides a final fallback rule, directing one to the place
of business, or principal place of business, of the intermediary.
Given the unfortunate but unavoidable complexity of these rules, the
Convention adds another provision to drive home the basic point. Article 6
provides that questions concerning the law governing the matters covered
by the Convention are not to be determined by such factors as the place of
incorporation of the issuer, the location of the certificates, or the location
of intermediaries other than the investor's own intermediary. This provi-
sion was included to provide a simple, convenient, explicit piece of text to
cite for the basic provision that the Convention completely rejects the "look
48. Article 5 then goes on to specify further that in deciding whether an account
agreement "expressly and unambiguously" states that it was entered into through a par-
ticular office, no account shall be taken of various enumerated provisions.
316 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 39
through" approach. Opinions differed on whether it was a good idea to
include this provision or not. One might say that given the detailed rules
contained in Articles 4 and 5, no one could possibly. think that the gov-
erning law was determined by such factors as the location of the underly-
ing certificates. On the other hand, the main point of the Convention is to
put the nail in the coffin for the traditional "look through" approach. Arti-
cle 6 ensures that no one could miss that point. In essence, Article 6 says
"Yes, we really mean it."
VI. Limiting the Subject-Regulation Versus Private Law
While the matters covered by the Hague Convention are of great
importance to modern securities transactions, it is perhaps equally impor-
tant to bear in mind what is not covered by the Convention.
Consider a routine transaction in which Investor purchases securities
through Firm. If the investment turns sour, Investor might well get into a
fight with Firm, such as a dispute about advice or information that Firm
gave Investor. Much of the modern law of securities trading is concerned
with the information provided to investors and the practices of firms
involved in the securities business. Moreover, governmental authorities are
often concerned with information about securities holding and trading,
whether for reasons of the fair operation of the securities markets them-
selves, or for reasons of policing against money laundering or the like.
The securities intermediary business is, in most jurisdictions, a highly
regulated business. The patterns of regulation and the territorial scope of
regulation vary Significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If an inter-
mediary is engaged in operations in multiple jurisdictions or if it solicits
business from customers in multiple jurisdictions, it will have to determine
whether its activities in a given jurisdiction are such that it subjects itself to
the regulatory authority of that jurisdiction.
For example, the law of the United States prohibits anyone from
engaging in business as a broker or dealer unless that person registers with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).49 Whether the U.S. regu-
latory law applies to transnational activities is a complex question gener-
ally thought to turn on the nature of conduct of the firm or effects on
investors located within the territory of the United States.50 Suppose that
49. 15 u.s.c. § 78o(a)(I) (2005) ("It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer ... to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect
any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any secur-
ity ... unless such broker or dealer is registered in accordance with subsection (b) of
this section.").
50. 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§§ 17.4[1]-17.4[12] (5th ed. 2005).
The SEC explains the matter as follows:
The SEC generally uses a territorial approach in applying registration require-
ments to the international operations of broker-dealers. Under this approach, all
broker-dealers physically operating within the United States that induce or
attempt to induce securities transactions must register with the SEC, even if
their activities are directed only to foreign investors outside of the United States.
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an intermediary is conducting affairs that subject it to regulation by the
SEC. Now, suppose that the Hague Convention becomes effective in the
United States, and suppose that the intermediary and its account holders
enter into an agreement stating that "it is agreed that the matters covered
by Article 2(1) of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain
Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary are governed by
the law of Mexico." What effect would that agreement, and ratification of
the Hague Convention by the United States, have on the regulatory author-
ity of the SEC?
None.
The question of the scope of the Hague Convention has nothing to do
with questions of the regulatory jurisdiction. Obviously the law that deter-
mines regulatory jurisdiction is not going to say that a party whose activi-
ties would otherwise subject it to regulatory authority in the state can
eliminate that authority by agreement.
At one point early in the drafting process for the Hague Convention,
the delegation of the United States, motivated by the excess of caution that
American lawyers commonly feel about the possibility that lawyers might
advance absurd arguments, suggested including in the text of the Conven-
tion a provision explicitly saying that the Convention "does not determine
the law applicable to ... the regulation of a securities intermediary."51 The
Permanent Bureau and the Drafting Committee, however, felt that this was
unnecessary, noting that "[w]e have not ... included the suggested refer-
ences to regulatory laws since these seemed to be different in kind from
those listed and to be very unlikely to be regarded as affected by a private
law convention."52 The final Explanatory Report does, however, note the
point quite clearly that "the Convention has no impact on regulatory
schemes relating to the issue or trading of securities, regulatory require-
ments placed on intermediaries, or enforcement actions taken by
regulators."53
But, lest there be any doubt on this issue, let us suppose that under the
regulatory law of some jurisdiction, an agreement entered into under the
Hague Convention might somehow have some effect on regulatory jurisdic-
tion. There are two possible consequences. First an intermediary that is
currently operating on the assumption that it is subject to the regulatory
In addition, foreign broker-dealers that, from outside of the United States,
induce or attempt to induce securities transactions by any person in the United
States, or that use the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce of the
United States for this purpose, also must register.
U.s. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION
§ II.D.6 (2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.html.
51. Letter from United States Delegation to the Hague Convention on Private Inter-
national Law to Christophe Bernasconi and Richard Potok (March 16, 2001) (on file
with author).
52. Hague Convention Permanent Bureau, Suggestions for Further Amendment of
the Text of Working Document 16 submitted by the Permanent Bureau, the Legal Expert
to the Permanent Bureau and Chair of the Drafting Group for the Drafting Meeting in
Paris (May 30-31, 2001) (on file with the author).
53. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 6, at 23.
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jurisdiction of Country A might conclude that if it enters into an agreement
with some or all of its account holders selecting the law of Country B for
Hague Convention purposes, then this might cause problems for the inter-
mediary by subjecting it to multiple inconsistent regimes of regulation.
The solution is pretty obvious. Do not enter into such an agreement. If the
customer wants the intermediary to do so, the intermediary just refuses. If
the customer is unhappy, the intermediary's business people will have the
convenient universal explanation that 'The lawyers made us do it."
Alternatively, suppose that the intermediary wants to enter into the
agreement selecting Country B law for Hague Convention purposes
because it somehow thinks that doing so will eliminate the regulatory
authority of Country A. The solution is equally simple. The regulatory
authorities in Country A-which, by hypothesis, have jurisdiction absent
the agreement-simply adopt a regulation prohibiting an intermediary sub-
ject to their jurisdiction from entering into any agreements selecting
another country's law for Hague Convention purposes.
In sum, the Hague Convention simply has no bearing on questions of
regulatory jurisdiction.
VII. Limiting the Subject-Contract Issues Versus Property Issues
Not only is the Hague Convention limited to matters of private law, it
is also limited to what might be termed "property law" issues, as distin-
guished from "contract law" issues.54 Seeing the implications of this limi-
tation is not easy. In part, the problem is another instance of the difficulty
of distinguishing reality from hypotheticals. It is tempting to discuss
problems of securities holding through simple examples in which a seller
in one country sells securities to a buyer in another country. But that form
of presentation obscures important consequences of the fact that securities
trading occurs through complex institutions involving multiple entities.
Even more important, simple hypotheticals tend to obscure the significant
difference between securities trades and settlement of securities trades.
Without a firm understanding of these matters it is difficult to understand
the approach to conflict of laws adopted by the Hague Convention.
Consider a version of what came to be known in the Hague Conven-
54. The qualification "roughly" is needed because in some systems of law, including
that of the United States, the term "property law" is somewhat problematic as applied to
the analysis of the rights of parties in the indirect securities holding system. For present
purposes, however, the important point is the distinction between contract issues and
"whatever," so that no harm will come from using the simple, familiar terms "property"
and "contract."
The discussion of property and contract issues in this section is adapted from a paper
presented by the author at an international symposium on the Hague Securities Conven-
tion, hosted by Rikkyo University, Tokyo, Japan, in October 2004. Papers from that
symposium are available at http://law.rikkyo.ac.jp/ribls/symposium/2004hague/
hague.htm
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tion drafting process as "the page 37 problem."55 Suppose that Seller,
located in Atlantis, holds shares of Issuer through an account with Atlantis
Firm, also located in Atlantis. Seller sells the shares to Buyer, located in
Batavia. Buyer holds through an account with Batavian Firm, located in
Batavia. The transaction between Atlantis Firm and Batavian Firm is set-
tled by entries on the books of Securities Depositary, located in Ruritania.
Under the Hague Convention, the relationship between Seller and Atlantis
Firm is governed by the securities intermediary's jurisdiction's law, pre-
sumably that of Atlantis. The relationship between Atlantis Firm and
Securities Depositary, and the relationship between Batavian Firm and
Securities Depositary, is governed by their securities intermediary's juris-
diction's law, presumably that of Ruritania. The relationship between
Batavian Firm and Buyer is governed by the securities intermediary's juris-
diction's law, presumably that of Batavia. The so-called "page 37 problem"
can be described as follows: "We seem to have a simple transaction
between Buyer and Seller, albeit effected through their firms and the clear-
ing agency, but why can't a single body of law describe the transaction?
Why complicate matters by dividing the transaction up into various sub-
components and then saying that a different body of law might apply to
each subcomponent?"
Answering that puzzle requires that we consider more carefully what it
could mean to say that there is a "transaction" in which securities are sold
from Buyer to Seller. Suppose that Buyer goes to Batavian Firm and places
an order to purchase 1000 shares of Acme Inc., a publicly traded corpora-
tion. Batavian Firm carries out the transaction, and Buyer receives a con-
firmation informing it that the trade was "executed" on a certain date at a
certain price. The most important thing to Buyer is the price of the trans-
action, and that will be determined by the price at which Batavian Firm
executed the trade. For most legal purposes, it makes perfect sense to focus
on the trade, in the sense of the transaction that Batavian Firm entered into
on Buyer's behalf to purchase the securities.
The subject matter of the Hague Convention, however, is the operation
of the system through which securities_transactions are settled, not the sys-
tem through which trades are executed. What it means to say that "Buyer's
Firm executed the trade" is that the firm entered into a contract for purchase
of the 1000 shares of Acme Inc. The terms of that contract will be set by
the practices and rules of the securities market or exchange through which
the contract was made. Among those terms will be provisions concerning
how and when the contract is to be performed by the actual delivery of
securities and payment of the purchase price. Thus, there are three aspects
to what might loosely be called "the transaction." First, there is the con-
tract for purchase and sale of the securities. Second, there is the process by
which one side of that contract is performed by payment of the purchase
price. Third, there is the process by which the other s~de of that contract is
55. The moniker "page 37 problem" comes from the fact that the issue was
prompted by discussion of an example that appeared on page 37 of Pre!. Doc. No.1.,
supra note 5.
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performed by delivery of the securities. The Hague Convention deals only
with the law governing the third aspect-the process by which the securi-
ties side of the contract is performed.
Separating the contract issues from the performance issues is quite
important in understanding the Hague Convention, but the separation is
not really unique to securities transactions. Consider an analogy from the
setting of tangible goods, such as a sale of coal from Seller, located in
Atlantis, to Buyer, located in Batavia. Suppose that Buyer happens to be in
Atlantis and sees that Seller has coal for sale. Buyer enters into a contract,
signed at Seller's place of business in Atlantis, to buy a certain quantity of
coal. Assume further that the contract calls for the Seller to deliver the coal
to the Buyer's place of Business in Batavia one month after the contract is
signed.
Suppose that before the time for performance, Seller learns that there
is another supplier of coal, Supplier, who has coal for sale in Batavia. To
save shipping expense, Seller buys from Supplier, directing Supplier to
deliver to Buyer. Supplier does so. Unless the contract between Seller and
Buyer required Seller to deliver "the coal that B saw at Seller's plant in
Atlantis," Seller can satisfy its obligations under the contract by causing
Buyer to receive delivery of coal of the specified grade. It doesn't matter-
so far as Seller's contractual obligations go-how Seller causes that to
occur.
However, issues of property law may depend on how Seller performed
its contract. Nothing can change the fact that the coal that Seller causes to
be delivered to Buyer is either (a) the coal that Buyer saw at Seller's plant in
Atlantis, or (b) the coal that Seller bought from Supplier. Suppose Seller
performed by causing Supplier to deliver to Buyer. Suppose further that
Supplier had stolen the coal from Owner. Owner learns what happened to
the coal and brings an action against Buyer. Buyer says "I have no idea
what you are talking about, who you are, or who Supplier is. I didn't deal
with you; I dealt with Seller. So I don't have to worry about your claim that
Supplier stole coal from you." But, Buyer is wrong about that. Either Buyer
does or does not have the coal that Supplier stole from Owner. That's a
question of physics, not law.
The relevant law might, or might not, say that Buyer gets good title.
That is an issue on which substantive laws vary. Under Anglo-American
law, a person who comes into possession of stolen goods must give them
back to the owner-it makes no difference whether the person paid good
value for the stolen goods or had any reason to be suspicious of their ori-
gin.56 By contrast, under many civil law systems, Buyer would take free
from Owner's claim, provided that Buyer paid value and lacked notice of
the theft. 57
56. RAy ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.3 (3d ed. 1975).
57. Saul Levrnore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Pur-
chaser, 16]. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987) (discussing differing approaches to buyers of stolen
goods in various ancient and modern legal systems).
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So, we may well have a conflict of laws question that must be
answered before we can determine whether Owner can or cannot recover
the stolen coal from Buyer. It is important to note that the resolution of
that conflict of laws question is not going to be determined by the fact that
the sales contract was the contract between Seller and Buyer. Rather the
conflict of laws question is likely to be determined by the situs of the coal.
The law of Atlantis, the place of business of the Seller in the sales contract,
has nothing to do with the issue. The relevant conflict of laws question is
whether the issue is governed by Batavian law or some other law. For
example, if Supplier stole the coal from Owner in Carolia, then there might
be a dispute about whether the property question is governed by the law of
Batavia or by the law of Carolia.58
Now return to the setting of securities transactions, in which Seller in
Atlantis enters into a contract for sale of certain securities to Buyer in Bata-
via. For the moment, assume that it makes sense to talk about a contract
for sale of securities between Seller and Buyer. Even so, the contract law
issues, and the issues of conflict of laws that might arise preliminary to
resolution of the contract law issues, have nothing to do with the property
law issues that might arise if there is some question about the interest that
Buyer receives. So too, if there are conflict of laws questions on the prop-
erty side, the resolution of those issues will have nothing to do with the
contract between Seller and Buyer. To see the point, suppose that Seller in
Atlantis enters into a contract for sale of designated securities to Buyer in
Batavia. Suppose that, for whatever reason, Seller performs by having Firm
deliver a certificate for the appropriate securities to Buyer. Suppose further
that it turns out that Firm stole that certificate from Owner. Owner discov-
ers the facts and brings an action against Buyer.
The scenario is essentially the same as the coal case considered above.
The fact that a securities certificate was delivered to Buyer in performance
of a sales contract between Seller and Buyer is pretty much irrelevant to
resolution of the property law issue. If Owner can show that the securities
certificate delivered to Buyer was the same certificate that was stolen by
Firm from Owner, then Owner presumably can make out a prima facie
case. One must then decide whether Buyer takes free from or subject to
Owner's claim. That may, in turn, pose a conflict of laws issue if the rules
of the various jurisdictions are different on the question whether, or in
what circumstances, a buyer is protected against adverse claims. One point
that is completely irrelevant to that conflict of laws question is the ques-
58. To be sure, contract law issues arising out of the contract for sale between Seller
and Buyer may become relevant again after the property issues have been determined.
If, under whatever law is determined to govern Owner's claim against Buyer, it is deter-
mined that Buyer received good title, free from Owner's claim, then Seller will have satis-
fied its obligations under the contract. On the other hand, if it is determined that Buyer .
does not take free from Owner's claim, then Buyer will presumably have a right to pur-
sue Seller for breach of the sales contract. That will be a question of the rights and
obligations of Buyer and Seller among themselves, and thus any conflict of laws issues
involved will appropriately be resolved by reference to connecting factors arising out of
the relationship between Buyer and Seller.
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tion of what law governs the sales contract between Seller and Buyer. The
issue is whether Owner-not Seller-can succeed in its action against Buyer
once Owner shows that Buyer has the same certificate that Firm stole from
Owner.
Suppose that Owner is located in Carolia, and that Firm stole the cer-
tificate from Owner in Carolia, and that Firm delivered the certificate to
Buyer in Batavia. The jurisdictions whose law might determine whether
Buyer takes free from Owner's claim are Carolia (the location of Owner and
the theft), Batavia (the location where the, certificate was delivered to the
buyer), and the jurisdiction where the issuer of the securities was organ-
ized. One jurisdiction that we can rule out is Atlantis. The fact that the
problem started with a contract for sale of securities from Seller in Atlantis
to Buyer in Batavia has nothing to do with the determination of the conflict
of laws question about whether Buyer takes free from or subject to the
claim of Owner.S9
We should also explore a bit more deeply the implicit assumption that
it makes sense to talk about "a" contract for sale of securities between
Seller and Buyer. In reality, what happens is that Seller calls its securities
firm, Atlantis Firm, and directs Atlantis Firm to sell. At about the same
time, Buyer calls its securities firm, Batavian Firm, and instructs Batavian
Firm to buy. Atlantis Firm and Batavian Firm enter into a contract for sale
of the securities through the facilities of some securities market or
exchange. Each of the firms then confirms to its customer that the trade
has been "executed." Note, however, one piece of information that would
be completely irrelevant to both Seller and to Buyer, and would, in fact,
never be disclosed to either-the identity of the other. Seller neither knows
nor cares who Buyer is, or who Buyer's Firm is. Buyer neither knows, nor
cares, who Seller is, or who Seller's Firm is. All that either Seller or Buyer
care about is that its firm has confirmed that the transaction has occurred.
Let us, then, consider the contract law analysis a bit more deeply. Spe-
cifically, let us consider whether there really is, in any useful sense, "a"
contract for sale from Seller to Buyer.
In part, the answer will depend on the roles that Seller's firm and
Buyer's firm play in the particular transaction. One possibility is that the
transaction is actually a "dealer" transaction rather than a "broker" transac-
tion. In that case, Atlantis Firm, acting as principal, buys the securities
from Seller. Then, Atlantis Firm sells the securities to Batavian Firm,
where Batavian Firm is also acting as a principal. Then, Batavian Firm,
again acting as principal, sells the securities to Buyer. If both Atlantis Firm
and Batavian Firm are acting as principals, then there simply is no contract
between Seller and Buyer. Instead, there are three separate sales contracts:
(1) Seller to Atlantis Firm, (2) Atlantis Firm to Batavian Firm, and (3) Bata-
59. As in the coal case considered above, if Buyer loses to Owner, then Buyer pre-
sumably has a breach of contract claim against Seller, and we may have a conflict of laws
question in connection with that contract issue, but that has nothing to do with the
question whether Buyer took free from or subject to Owner's claim, nor with any conflict
of laws questions that may arise in connection with that property law issue.
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vian Firm to Buyer. In that case, even if we confine our attention to the
contract law issues, which as noted above are not the subject of the Hague
Convention, the notion that there are separate transactions that might be
governed by separate bodies of law is not at all anomalous. Then, when we
turn from the contract issues to the property issues that might arise in
connection with performance of those contracts, the result that different
bodies of law apply to the three entirely distinct transactions is hardly
surprising.
Suppose that the firms act as brokers in the transaction rather than as
dealers. Does that really make any significant difference in the analysis?
When Atlantis Firm and Batavian Firm meet through the facilities of some
securities market or exchange, they enter into a contract for sale of securi-
ties, with each party acting as agent for an undisclosed principal. They
would never reveal the identity of their respective principals, both because
that information is entirely irrelevant to the transaction, and because, for
competitive reasons, neither firm is interested in revealing information
about the identity of its customers. So, looking only at the contract analy-
sis, we have a situation in which Atlantis Firm (acting as agent for Seller as
an undisclosed principal) enters into a contract for sale of securities to
Batavian Firm (acting as agent for Buyer as an undisclosed principal).
Consider what body of law governs the various relationships. As between
Seller and Atlantis Firm, the question is what law governs the rights and
duties of a principal and an agent who enters into a transaction on behalf
of the principal, doing so as agent for an undisclosed principal. That is a
question of the rights and duties as between Seller and Atlantis Firm, albeit
rights and duties that arose in connection with a transaction that Atlantis
Firm entered into with someone else. But it seems clear that the question
of the rights and duties as between Seller and Atlantis Firm would be deter-
mined by the law proper to their relationship. In the simple example where
both are located in Atlantis, and where the agreement between them is gov-
erned by Atlantis law, that would be the law of Atlantis. If one were to say
that the law governing the relationship between Seller and Atlantis Firm is
determined by the law that might apply to a direct contract between Seller
and Buyer, then one would end up with the odd conclusion that the con-
tractual relationship between a securities firm and its customer is not
determined by a single body of law, but varies, transaction by transaction,
depending on the identity and location of the ultimate counterparty to the
trade.
There is now no need to examine in detail the question of the law that
would govern the contractual relationship between Buyer and Batavian
Firm. The situation is exactly the same as the analysis of the contractual
relationship between Seller and Atlantis Firm. Thus, the relationship
between Batavian Firm and Buyer would be governed by the law of Batavia.
Now, consider what body of law would govern the contract law analy-
sis of the relationship between Atlantis Firm (acting as agent for an undis-
closed principal) and Batavian Firm (acting as agent for an undisclosed
principal). Once again, it makes no sense to suppose that the law gov-
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erning this relationship is determined by anything having to do with either
Seller or Buyer. To suppose the contrary would again mean that neither
Atlantis Firm nor Batavian Firm could determine what law governs the
contractual relationship between them, because each is acting as agent for
an undisclosed principal. Accordingly, neither securities firm knows the
identity of the other's customer. Rather, the answer must be that the law
governing the contractual relationship between Atlantis Firm and Batavian
Firm is determined by facts arising out of the relationship between them.
In any transaction effected through the facilities of an organized securities
market or exchange, that question will invariably be resolved by the rules
and practices of the market or exchange in question. For example, if the
contract between Atlantis Firm and Batavian Firm is made through the
facilities of a securities exchange in Atlantis, it will undoubtedly be gov-
erned by the law of Atlantis. If the contract is made through the facilities of
a securities exchange in Batavia, it will undoubtedly be governed by Bata-
vian law. If the contract between Atlantis Firm and Batavian Firm is made
through the facilities of a securities exchange in another country, it will
undoubtedly be governed by the law of that country.
Thus, whether the securities firms in question are acting as dealers or
as brokers, it is not possible that a single body of law will govern all of the
contractual relationships involved in the transaction between Seller, Atlan-
tis Firm, Batavian Firm, and Buyer. Rather, even on the contractual side,
the conflict of laws analysis must proceed in a step by step fashion. It
makes no sense to suppose that the conflict of laws analysis should be
determined by the happenstance that the transaction can-from the stand-
point of lawyers' hypotheticals, rather than actual cases-be described as a
sale from Seller to Buyer.
Thus far we have been considering the conflict of laws analysis that
would apply to the contractual relationships among the parties. Now let us
turn to the matters that are actually the subject of the Hague Convention-
the property law side. The basic points developed in the contractual analy-
sis described above remain significant. In particular, it is important to
note the very odd consequences that would follow from the notion that an
ordinary international securities market transaction could appropriately be
described as one in which a property interest in the securities passes from
Seller to Buyer, through the vehicles of Atlantis Firm, Securities Depository,
and Batavian Firm. That consequence is as follows: No one would ever
know whether he got good title. If the only way of concluding that Buyer
got good title is to determine that title passed from Seller, then no buyer
would everknow whether or not he got good title. For the reality is that in
an ordinary market transaction, no buyer would ever know who the seller
is.
Indeed, the problem is worse than one of access to information. We
have been supposing that it makes sense to regard the performance stage of
a securities contract as a process by which the individual securities that are
the subject of the sales contract pass from Seller to Buyer, through the vehi-
cles of the securities firms and settlement system. That is possible, but it
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is, in fact, relatively unlikely. In modern securities markets, settlement
does not generally occur on an individual trade by trade basis. Rather, all
of the trades made through the securities firms on a given market or
exchange are commonly reduced to a single net dehver or receive pOSition.
Settlement then occurs on an aggregate basis.
Suppose, for example, that our hypothetical Seller-Buyer trade is made
on the Ruritanian Stock Exchange, and that the members of the Ruritanian
Stock Exchange settle among themselves on a net basis. That means that at
the end of a given day's trading, all of the obligations of the participants are
netted to a single deliver or receive position. Once that occurs, it really
makes no sense to talk about how settlement of "the Seller to Buyer" trade
takes place. There never is any individual movement of securities from
Seller to Buyer, not even from Atlantis Firm to Batavian Firm. Rather, there
is simply a movement of securities to or from Atlantis Firm and the clear-
ing system, and a movement of securities to or from Batavian Firm and the
clearing system.
The simplest way of seeing why it makes no sense to ask how the indi-
vidual Seller-Buyer trade is settled is to suppose that in the aggregate Atlan-
tis Firm has a net receive position for that day's trades and Batavian Firm
has a net deliver position. Thus although Seller is selling through Atlantis
Firm, and Buyer is buying through Batavian Firm, there will be no move-
ment of securities from Atlantis Firm to Batavian Firm. Rather, the oppo-
site will occur; securities will move from Batavian Firm to Atlantis Firm.
Or it might happen that the positions of each of our two securities firms
with respect to all other members of the settlement system happen to be
such that no securities move to or from either firm when the final settle-
ment obligations are determined for that day's trading. If no securities
pass from Atlantis Firm to Batavian Firm, a legal analysis that insists that
the only way the Seller-Buyer transaction can be described is a passage of a
property interest from Seller to Buyer produces the odd consequence that
whether Buyer does or does not get good title depends of the fortuity of
what other trades happen to be made through the firms that day.
Thus far we have been assuming that our basic hypothetical scenario
is one in which Seller in Atlantis sells securities through Atlantis Firm to
Buyer in Batavia, acting through Batavian Firm, and that "the transaction"
between Atlantis Firm and Batavian Firm occurs through Securities Depos-
itory located in Ruritania. Let us think a bit more carefully about the dif-
ference between the contract analysis of the sales contract and the property
law analysis of the process through which the sales obligations are per-
formed. One question is what law governs the sales contract between
Atlantis Firm (acting as agent for Seller as undisclosed principal) and Bata-
vian Firm (acting as agent for Buyer as undisclosed principal). Another
question is what law governs the property law issues that might arise in
connection with performance of that sales contract. Most often the same
law will govern both the contract issues and the property issues, but there
is no reason that must be the case. Suppose, for example that the contract
between Atlantis Firm and Batavian Firm is made on the Ruritanian Stock
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Exchange, but that the rules of the Ruritanian Stock Exchange provide that
settlement either must or might be made on the books of the Erehwon
Securities Depository. The rules of the Ruritanian Stock exchange
undoubtedly will provide that the contract between Atlantis Firm and Bata-
vian Firm is governed by the law of Ruritania. But, the rules of the
Erehwon Securities Depository will undoubtedly provide that the right of
participants arising out of movements of securities through the Erehwon
Securities Depository are governed by the law of Erehwon. The contract
issues and the property issues are simply different. There is no reason to
suppose that they must be governed by the same body of law.
Thus far, we have been considering a transaction for the sale of securi-
ties. Let us now turn to pledge transactions. Suppose, for example, that
Borrower, located in Atlantis, wishes to grant a security interest in certain
indirectly-held securities to Lender, located in Batavia. Before the transac-
tion, Borrower maintains its securities in an account with Atlantis Firm.
Lender insists that securities that are collateral for loans made by it be
transferred into a special pledge account that it maintains with its interme-
diary Batavian Bank. Borrower and Lender sign a loan and security agree-
ment. They also arrange for the securities to be transferred from
Borrower's account with Atlantis Firm to Lender's account with Batavian
Bank. The transaction between Atlantis Firm and Batavian Bank is settled
by debits and credits on the books of Securities Depository, located in
Ruritania. How does the fact that we have a pledge rather than a sale
change the conflict of laws analysis?
The main difference is that the pledge transaction is simpler than the
sales transaction with respect to the contractual side. As we have seen, in a
securities sales transaction, it really doesn't make much sense to talk about
"a" contract between Seller and Buyer. Rather, all of the questions that
matter deal with the separate contractual relationships between seller and
its securities firm, between the securities firms, and between buyer and its
securities firm. By contrast, in a secured lending transaction, there will be
a direct contractual relationship between borrower and lender. Thus, the
contractual side of the conflict of laws analysis is likely to be simpler for a
pledge than for a sale. But that difference is only a matter of the contrac-
tual relationship and, as we have seen, the Hague Convention has nothing
to do with the contractual relationship.
On the property law side-which is the matter governed by the Hague
Convention-there really isn't any significant difference between the sales
transaction and the pledge transaction. How the movement of securities in
settlement of the pledge transaction is effected is a matter of the rules of
the relevant securities depository. It is entirely possible that Securities
Depository in our example would treat a movement of securities in settle-
ment of a pledge under the same system as a movement in settlement of a
sale or any other transaction. In that case, we might well have scenarios of
the sort considered above in which the net changes of position between
Atlantis Firm and Batavian Bank bear no relationship to the individual
transaction in which Batavian Bank's position is to be credited and Atlantis
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Bank's position is to be debited. Even if the transaction between Atlantis
Firm and Batavian Bank is settled on a gross basis (that is, transaction by
transaction) it remains the case that all of the significant questions on the
property law side will be answerable only by reference to the individual
relationships between customers and their intermediaries.
For example, in our hypothetical transaction, all that Lender in Bata-
via cares about is that the designated securities show up in the designated
pledge account on the books of Batavian Bank. It shouldn't make any dif-
ference to Lender whether Borrower caused that to occur by a transaction
that started with a debit to Borrower's account at Atlantis Firm, or a debit
to another account that Borrower maintains with Carolia Firm, or to an
account maintained by an entity somehow related to Borrower that hap-
pens to be maintained with Erehwon Firm. What matters to Lender is that
the required collateral appears in the specified account at Batavian Bank.
From the standpoint of conflict of laws, what matters is that Lender be
assured that if Batavian law says that the appearance of the collateral in
that account suffices to give Lender a perfected security interest, then
Lender need not worry about the secured transaction law of any of the
other jurisdictions that might have somehow been involved in the series of
related transactions.
Consider, for example, a scenario somewhat like that in the well-
known Maxwell case.60 Borrower tells Lender that it will pledge Acme Inc
securities to Lender as collateral for the loan. The Acme securities are
transferred from an account maintained in the name of an entity related to,
but legally distinct from, Borrower. As it happens, Borrower is acting
wrongfully against that related entity in causing the Acme securities to be
pledged to Lender. Suppose that those Acme securities happened to have
been maintained by the entity related to Borrower in an account with
Erehwon Firm in Erehwon. Indeed, suppose that Lender has no idea where
those securities came from, but knows only that Borrower somehow
caused the securities to end up in the designated pledge account that
Lender maintains with Batavian Bank. The important thing is that Lender
knows what body of law will determine whether it takes its pledge interest
free from or subject to the claim of the related entity. International pledge
transactions can only be effected in a safe and efficient manner if Lender
can know with certainty that this question will be determined under a sin-
gle, knowable body of law. And, whether we like it or not, the only knowa-
ble body of law is the law of a jurisdiction determined by factors arising
out of the relationship between Lender and its intermediary, Batavian
Bank.
Conclusion
The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in
Respect of Securities makes a significant advance in thinking about conflict
60. Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust pic (No.3) [19961 1 All E.R. 585
(Eng.).
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of laws for this important area. The problems that the Convention treats
will not go away. It is highly unlikely that there will ever be uniformity on
the substantive law in this area. 61 The Convention adopts an approach to
these problems that responds to the realities of the current marketplace.
One of the challenges that the Convention poses is that lawyers must be
willing to abandon certain traditional concepts in dealing with these
problems. For example, such shopworn phrases as "lex situs" or "party
autonomy" do not capture the issues that must be confronted in this
area.62 Use of such phrases only obscures the real issues. So too, it will
not suffice to adopt a partial solution. It is, at first blush, tempting to say
that all one needs to do is say that the law governing transactions in securi-
ties held through an intermediary should be determined by the "location of
the account." Yet that concept is meaningless. Accordingly, to state the
conflict of laws rules in such terms is to ensure that the rules will not work
in any hard case, and hard cases are where the rules are needed. The
experts who worked for several years on these problems considered with
great care a host of different approaches to the problem of giving specific
content to the general idea that the governing law should be determined
solely by reference to the relationship between the intermediary and its
account holders. Ultimately, the conclusion was reached that the only real-
istic way to solve that problem was the "agreement plus reality test" formu-
lation adopted in the Convention.
61. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
62. See supra Introduction.
